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Nostalgic memories are universal experiences that typically contain emotions characterized by a 
warm, sentimental yearning for the past or tales of redemption leading to triumph (Wildschut, 
Sedikides, Arndt, & Routledge, 2006). Several studies have documented nostalgic recall’s ability 
to enhance psychological well-being through increasing the sense of a cohesive self-identity 
across time, promoting social connectedness, and drawing on past experiences to enhance 
problem solving and to guide future behaviors. The domains of these effects overlap with the 
socio-cognitive deficits occurring in depression and being able to elicit these effects would be 
helpful for addressing the corresponding depressive symptoms. However, there is a paucity of 
research assessing the degree to which mood state impacts the nostalgic recall process. 
Mindfulness interventions have been shown to increase richness of memory recall and reduce 
depressive symptoms through augmenting attention and reducing rumination. This study 
hypothesized that these changes resulting from a brief mindfulness intervention would increase 
state levels of nostalgia. A series of three experiments investigated the relationship between level 
of depressive symptomology and the state level of nostalgia as well as how mindfulness impacts 
this relationship. Experiments 1 (n = 200) and 2 (n = 200) examined the effects of level of 
depressive symptomology on the state level of nostalgia in an online sample recruited through 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and in a sample of undergraduate students. Experiment 3 
(n = 473) examined how a brief mindfulness intervention impacted these effects and how 
mindfulness and nostalgia effected depressive symptomology over the course of the experiment. 
The present project provided evidence for the impact of heightened state levels of nostalgia on 
depressive symptomology and demonstrated that 1) higher depressive symptomology reduces 
state levels of nostalgia, 2) higher subjectively reported levels of mindfulness improve state 
 iv 
levels of nostalgia, as measured by the State Functions of Nostalgia Scale (Hepper, Ritchie, 
Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2012), and 3) engaging in nostalgic recall and higher state levels of 
nostalgia predicted decreases in depressive symptomology. 
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Impact of Mood on State Levels of Nostalgia 
People formulate their sense of self and identity from a collection of life stories, which 
are based on episodic and autobiographical memories. This collection of stories is known as an 
individual’s narrative identity. Narrative identity has been broadly conceptualized as a way for 
people to link their past, present, and thoughts about their future in order to create meaning, 
continuity, and aspiration (McAdams & McLean, 2013; Singer, Blagov, Berry, & Oost, 2013). 
One type of autobiographical memory that contributes to the narrative identity and that is of 
interest to clinical psychology is nostalgic memory. Nostalgic memories are ubiquitous 
experiences that elicit a common pattern of emotions across cultures and age groups. They are 
generally experienced several times per week and are spurred by numerous internal and external 
sources (e.g., Hepper, Ritchie, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2012; Sedikides, Wildschut, Routledge, 
Arndt, et al., 2015). Nostalgic memories are typically thought of as a self-relevant, warm 
reminiscing and longing for one’s past. They tend to revolve around satisfying moments that 
focus on positive aspects of experiences (Wildschut et al., 2006).  
Previous studies have linked the structure and themes presented in nostalgic memories to 
well-being, coping, and health (Dunlop & Tracy, 2013; McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, Patten, & 
Bowman, 2001). These studies have also outlined nostalgic recall’s effects and have proposed 
potential mechanisms for these effects. Engaging in nostalgic recall bolsters self-esteem and 
optimism; it fosters feelings of social connectedness and meaning making (for a review: 
Sedikides, Wildschut, Routledge, Arndt, et al., 2015). Negative life events can trigger nostalgic 
memories. In turn, this recall can help  buffer against negative events through promoting a 
coherent connection between a person’s past and his/her present sense of self known as self-
continuity (Sedikides, Wildschut, Routledge, & Arndt, 2014). The power of nostalgic memories 
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seems to come from their ability to help people derive meaning from past events to re-engage 
individuals in the present (Routledge et al., 2011). 
Although the current view of nostalgic recall posits it as a positive experience that 
individuals can draw on, this view has evolved over time. Initially stigmatized and pathologized, 
experiences of nostalgia were thought to be indicative of a melancholic psychiatric disorder 
spurred by homesickness (de Diego & Ots, 2014; McCann, 1941). Historically, this disorder was 
marked by loneliness, weeping, isolation, sadness, an obsession with returning home, and a 
feeling of suffering related to the nostalgic memories. Over time, the stigma and pathological 
label associated with nostalgic experiences faded as research began to demonstrate their utility as 
part of a normal, adaptive coping response that helps restore equilibrium after life challenges and 
transitions (Sedikides et al., 2014). While these two views of nostalgic experiences seem 
diametrically opposed, current findings in different populations yield credence to both 
conceptualizations.  This disparity in findings suggests a need to explore moderating variables. 
The effects of nostalgic memories have largely been studied in psychologically healthy 
populations. However, recent work examining the effects of nostalgic recall in habitual worriers 
demonstrated that this type of recall can increase distress in habitual worries (Verplanken, 2012).  
This work implies that mood might, at least, mediate the role of nostalgic memories in coping 
processes.  
Furthermore, in disorders like depression, individuals hold dysfunctional views of 
themselves related to the past, present, and future. Research has shown that people with 
depression exhibit aberrant, maladaptive processing of emotional, self-referent memories, 
typifying rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). Depressed 
individuals also develop overgeneralized autobiographical memories (e.g. memories relating to a 
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category, reoccurring events, or a long period of time (birthday parties), rather than a particular 
instance (10
th
 birthday party)), potentially minimizing their ability to fully engage in nostalgic 
recall (Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993; Hipwell, Sapotichne, Klostermann, Battista, 
& Keenan, 2011; Park, Goodyer, & Teasdale, 2002). In addition, depressed individuals have a 
low sense of self-worth and self-esteem (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001; Crocker, 2002; Pyszczynski & 
Greenberg, 1987). Thus, nostalgic memories may serve a different role in depressed individuals 
as depressed individuals may find engaging in nostalgic memories to be more difficult.  In 
depressed individuals, these memories may promote less continuity of self-concept and may not 
engender effective coping in the same way as in healthy individuals. Consequently, making the 
leap from the past into the present, which is required to reap the benefits of nostalgic recall, may 
be difficult for individuals with depression and particularly ones who are prone to rumination. 
These individuals tend to struggle to disengage with the past and focus their attention on the 
present. Future work is needed to understand how nostalgic memories function in negative mood 
states.  
One possible way to increase the potential effects of recalling nostalgic memories for 
individuals with depression is through mindfulness based interventions. Mindfulness based 
interventions, which have garnered much attention in recent years, are efficacious at improving 
well-being and symptoms of depression (Helen & Teasdale, 2004; Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt, & 
Oh, 2010; Kuyken et al., 2008; Teasdale et al., 2000; Van Dam, Hobkirk, Sheppard, Aviles-
Andrews, & Earleywine, 2014). These interventions strive to focus attention in the present and 
encourage the development of non-judgmental, accepting views. These views enhance self-
regulation and decrease emotional avoidance (Baer, 2009). Mindfulness based interventions have 
also been shown to promote self-efficacy (Chang et al., 2004) as well as reduce overgeneralized 
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autobiographical memories in health people and in formerly depressed patients (Heeren, Van 
Broeck, & Philippot, 2009; Williams, Teasdale, Segal, & Soulsby, 2000). Based on this past 
research, it stands to reason that mindfulness based interventions may improve an individuals’ 
ability to recall specific nostalgic events and promote self-efficacy and hope.  Activating non-
judgmental focus with mindfulness based interventions may also serve to help reconcile 
dissonant views of one’s past and present self that may arise in depressed individuals.  If a 
mindfulness intervention can help in this way, it would enable depressed individuals to more 
fully engage in the recall process.   Allowing for a fuller engagement in nostalgic recall, 
mindfulness should work synergistically with and nostalgic recall to promote increased well-
being.  Taken together, nostalgic recall and mindfulness may serve as therapeutic compliments in 
restoring and creating a unified, positive narrative identity that links the past, present, and future.   
Given the lack of research on the intersection of nostalgic recall and depression, the aim 
of this project was to synthesize and expand the literature on how nostalgic experiences relate to 
depressive symptomology. To lay the groundwork for this project, I will summarize the current 
literature on triggers and tendencies for engaging in nostalgic recall, the common effects of 
engaging in nostalgic recall, and the proposed mechanisms behind these effects. I will also 
review the literature on attentional and cognitive biases in depression. This will allow for a 
discussion of how depressive symptomology may interact with nostalgic recall to affect nostalgic 
recall’s efficacy at promoting well-being. This background will also lay the framework for 
exploring how mindfulness based interventions may help restore nostalgic recall’s effects in 
depressed populations. Lastly, this proposal will report three studies that empirically evaluated 
the relationship between depressive symptomology and the effects of engaging in nostalgic recall 
as well as mindfulness’ effects on this relationship.  
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Nostalgic Recall 
Much of the research to date on the effects of nostalgic recall has been done with healthy 
individuals, but there exists a paucity of research on how mood disorders such as depression may 
influence the effects of nostalgic recall. To understand why mood may moderate the effects of 
nostalgic recall, this review will first define what is meant by nostalgic recall and then discuss 
the common factors that elicit it, its effects, and the proposed mechanisms behind these effects. 
Numerous studies have sought to define the construct of nostalgia and what constitutes a 
nostalgic memory (e.g., Batcho, 1998; Hertz, 1990; Wildschut et al., 2006) .  However, there 
remains a lack of consensus on this matter.  Hepper and colleagues (2012) summarize this 
debate, noting that nostalgia has been characterized as a psychological resource, a predominately 
positive, negative, or ambivalent experience, and an emotion.  They note that most definitions 
lack either scientific rigor in their derivation or fail to thoroughly capture the scope of the 
construct.  Asserting that there is not a simple binary determination of whether an experience is 
nostalgic or not, Hepper and colleagues (2010) argue that experiences vary in degree of 
epitomizing nostalgic. To support this assertion, they pursued a line of research to determine the 
features that are most typical of, and most closely related to nostalgic recall. This study asked 
participants to generate a list of words that were characteristics of nostalgic experiences. These 
words were then used to derive 35 features of nostalgic experiences. A separate set of 102 
participants then used an eight point Likert scale to rate these features on their centrality or 
relatedness to the construct of nostalgia. The most central features found to represent nostalgia 
were a found remembering or reminiscing of personally meaningful, memories of the past 
typically relating to a social relationship or childhood. This study also found nostalgia to be 
regarded as an emotion with a primarily positive affective tone, but that encompasses a longing 
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or for the past. While negative emotions (e.g. regret, sadness, and loneliness) were also 
associated with nostalgia, they were only peripherally related. Researchers found that people 
remember and focus on the central features of an event, which tend to be the more positive ones 
(Hepper et al., 2012). Building upon past research, Oba and colleagues (2016) conducted an 
exploratory factor analysis of the factor structure of nostalgia and found two dimensions of 
nostalgic experiences: emotional and personal significance as well as chronological remoteness.  
They also found that when recalling nostalgic memories, the brain recruits areas associated with 
memory and with reward to construct these memories, reinforcing the notion that nostalgic 
experiences capture a particular type of autobiographical memory that has a predominantly 
positive or pleasing association. 
Nostalgic experiences have also been examined cross-culturally. In a study with 1,704 
student participants from 18 countries representing five continents, Hepper et al. (2014) found 
that the rank order of centrality of these 35 previously derived features of nostalgic experiences 
had strong positive correlations across countries, implying that there is a universal 
conceptualization of nostalgic experiences.  In addition to having a culturally generalizable 
definition, nostalgic experiences are common across cultures and age groups, ranging from older 
children to elderly adults. For instance, in a sample of undergraduate students, 79% of 
participants reported experiencing nostalgia at least once per week or more and 26% endorsed 
experiencing it at least once a day (Wildschut et al., 2006). Given the ubiquitous experience of 
nostalgia and the high prevalence of depression, investigating its triggers and effects across 
varying degrees of depressive symptomatology has important implications for understanding and 
treating mood disorders.  
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As outlined above, the field lacks a consensus on what constitutes a nostalgic memory 
and how nostalgic memories are unique from autobiographical memories or from reminiscing.  
This study argues that nostalgic memories are a subtype of autobiographical memories.  They 
tend to elicit high valence/low arousal emotions (Trost, Ethofer, Zentner, & Vuilleumier, 2012) 
and tend to be personally significant memories.  D’Argembeau, Comblain, and Van der Linden 
(2003) examined the emotional content of positive, negative, and neutral autobiographical 
events, while Wildschut and colleagues (2006) examined the emotional content of nostalgic 
memoires.  D’Argembeau, Comblain, and Van der Linden (2003) found that recall of positive 
events lead to more positive and less negative feelings than recalling either negative or neutral 
events.  Conversely, negative events elicited more negative emotions than positive or neutral 
events, and neutral events evoked more positive than negative feelings.  Examining nostalgic 
memory recall, Wildschut and colleagues (2006) found that nostalgic memories tend to be more 
positive than negative overall, but relatively low arousal (positive affect mean = 2.37 and 
negative affect mean = 1.37 when rated on a 1-5 Likert scale for intensity).  While not a direct 
comparison, these studies looking at the emotional content of different kinds of memories 
highlight that in terms of emotional intensity, nostalgic memories may be most similar to neutral 
autobiographical memories, but more personally salient (Oba et al., 2016).     
Reminiscing, while similar to nostalgic recall in its effects, has an evaluative component 
that examines the meaning of the event and its importance and is often done with other people 
(Fivush, 2008).  For the purposes of the present study, nostalgic recall and nostalgic experiences 
will be operationalized as the experience of recalling a past autobiographical event that is 
associated with a sentimental longing for the past.   
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Proneness to Engage in Nostalgia 
 To capitalize on and determine the effects of nostalgic experiences, it is important to 
identify their eliciting factors. Research has demonstrated that there are several determinants that 
effect the types of memories people recall and their proneness to recall nostalgic memories. For 
example, both mood and self-esteem influence the types of memories individuals recall. 
Individuals with high self-esteem tend to recall nostalgic, mood incongruent memories when in a 
negative mood state, whereas individuals with low self-esteem tend to recall more mood 
congruent memories (Smith & Petty, 1995). Although individuals with low self-esteem are 
capable of recalling equally positive memories as those with high self-esteem, higher self-esteem 
individuals showed a greater mood improvement after these recalls than did lower self-esteem 
individuals (Setliff & Marmurek, 2002). This suggests that for individuals who spend more time 
in negative mood states, such as individuals with depression, engaging in nostalgic recall would 
be less likely to promote mood improvements seen in individual who are primarily in positive 
mood states. 
In addition to mood and self-esteem, perceived self-efficacy and cognitive style may also 
impact recall of nostalgic memories. Self-efficacy is a construct that is highly linked to self-
esteem (Judge, Erez, Bono, & Thoresen, 2002; Lane, Lane, & Kyprianou, 2004), so , it is not 
surprising that self-efficacy also impacts the recall of autobiographical memories.  When 
presented with 20 positive and negative cue words and asked to recall past events and imagine 
future events based on the cue words, individuals with higher self-efficacy produced more 
specific and more positive memories of past events and projections of future events than 
individuals with lower self-efficacy and exhibited better social problem solving skills (Brown, 
Dorfman, Marmar, & Bryant, 2012). Since self-identity plays a role in autobiographical memory 
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recall, projections about the future, and problem solving, which are constructs that have also 
been linked with nostalgic recall, exploring self-concept and self-esteem with respect to nostalgic 
recall will be important.    
Effects and Triggers 
Several theorists (e.g., Bluck, Alea, Habermas, & Rubin, 2005; Bluck, 2003; Sedikides et 
al., 2014; Wildschut et al., 2006) have classified the effects of autobiographic and nostalgic 
recall into three categories related to: the self, social bonds, and directive effects. These 
categories, first established with respect to autobiographical memory were replicated with 
nostalgic memory.  The effects on the self refer to strengthening self-esteem and maintaining a 
cohesive sense of self-identity and meaning. The social effects help connect individuals with one 
another, providing additional social support and alternate perspectives on situations. The 
directive effects enhance problem solving and guides future behaviors through drawing on past 
successes. Each of these effects will be discussed in further detail in the following sections. 
Self. 
With respect to the self, autobiographical memories, such as nostalgic ones, have been 
associated with creating and sustaining a consistent, coherent life narrative and with making the 
present meaningful (Conway, 2005; McAdams et al., 2001; Routledge et al., 2011; Sedikides, 
Wildschut, Gaertner, Routledge, & Arndt, 2008). An exploratory factor analysis found that 
autobiographical memories help people define their identity through understanding who they are 
currently, how this person relates to who they were in the past, noting differences and similarities 
over time (Bluck et al., 2005). Motifs that are most salient and congruent to people’s self-
conceptualization are captured and stored as rich memories that people retrieve often and tend to 
be organized by conceptual themes (Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004). In this way, what 
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Conway and colleagues term as self-defining memories are a collection of remembered events 
that serve as evidence to support people’s core beliefs about themselves and can be recalled 
differentially based on an individual’s current goal or affective state. Based on this definition, 
self-defining memories are likely to be nostalgic ones.  In Bluck and Liao’s literature review of 
autobiographical and memory and reminiscence (2013), they propose a conceptual model and 
build on Conway’s argument asserting that memories about one’s self function to create 
continuity of the self throughout life, linking the past with the present.   
Conducting a series of six experiments, Routledge and colleagues (2011) tested this 
theoretical framework by evoking nostalgia.  They found that increasing nostalgia increases 
people’s sense of meaning and that this effect was mediated by feeling connected to others.  
Sedikides and colleagues (2014) also found that experimental induced nostalgia increased self-
continuity more than recalling an ordinary or a positive event.  They also found that when 
inducing self-discontinuity in a disruptive manner, people reported higher levels of nostalgia as 
compared to inducing self-di continuity in a relatively non-disruptive manner or when preserving 
self-continuity.  However, nostalgic recall may not always be helpful; Iyer and Jetten (2011) 
manipulated identity continuity and level of nostalgia and found that individuals with greater 
self-continuity who engaged in nostalgic recall perceived themselves better able to cope with 
challenges in the present, reported higher levels of psychological well-being, and were more 
interested in pursuing new opportunities than individuals with low identity continuity.  
Individuals with low identity continuity who see the past as weakly connected to or disconnected 
from the present and who engaged in nostalgic recall had a lower perceived ability to cope with 
challenges in the present, were less interested in pursuing new opportunities, and were more 
interested in familiar environments.  These findings suggest that nostalgic recall does not 
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function that same way across all individuals.  One’s self view across time is a key factor in 
predictor of how nostalgic recall will impact people.   
Iyer and Jetten’s work (2011) provides support for the idea that nostalgic recall may 
function differently in depressive mood states than in more positive ones, given that identity 
continuity is often lower in depressed individuals (Angus & Kagan, 2013).  Research suggests 
that individuals with depressed mood states, who tend to use autobiographical memory for 
identity clarity and sense of self as well as for problem-solving, show a decrease in depressive 
symptoms over time through increasing self-worth, meaning in life, and feelings of competence 
(Hallford & Mellor, 2016).  However, depressed individuals are less efficacious at engaging in 
adaptive, useful autobiographical memory recall that aids with self-continuity.  This deficiency is 
thought to be linked with the ruminative thoughts associated with depression (Grace, Dewhurst, 
& Anderson, 2016). Nostalgic memories’ effects on the self are also connected to emotion 
regulation (Koole, 2009; Pasupathi, 2003; Pierro, Pica, Klein, Kruglanski, & Higgins, 2013). 
People tend to seek pleasurable emotional states (Tamir, Chiu, & Gross, 2007) and use memories 
to help regulate emotions, allowing them to move their attention away from aversive emotions 
and reappraise the emotional impact of an event (Holland & Kensinger, 2010). This is an 
example of a healthy coping method and is one that is often is arrested in depression due to 
rumination. Healthy individuals also mentally distance themselves from negative events and 
failures, placing these occurrences further back in their memories and see positive events as 
more recent (Ross & Wilson, 2002). Nostalgia helps promote positive self-regard and fosters 





Autographical memories, including nostalgic ones, not only connect people to their past, 
but also connect them to others in several ways. As nostalgic memories often have a strong 
social theme (Wildschut et al., 2006), it is not surprising that they foster and promote feelings of 
social bonds and attachment. Wildschut and colleagues demonstrated that participants engaging 
in a nostalgic recalled, compared ones engaging in an ordinary recall, reported higher levels of 
social bonding.  This increased perception of social cohesion is important for well-being and 
adapting to change, given people’s inherent need to belong and form interpersonal relationships 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Conversely, without these social ties, lonely, socially disconnected 
individuals experience greater difficulty adjusting to change (Duru, 2008).  Nostalgic recall has 
demonstrated the ability to reduce feelings of loneliness and augment feelings of perceived social 
support (Zhou, Sedikides, Wildschut, & Gao, 2008). More generally, autobiographically 
memories have been shown to connected people through creating a collective narrative that is 
constructed with others and then reconstructed with others when recalled (e.g., Fivush, 2008; 
Fivush, Haden, & Reese, 1996).  Thus, the act of recalling social memories with others also 
serves to connect people and increase bonding. 
McAdams (1993) argues that construction and reconstruction of life events is critical for 
the formation of people’s identity.  Memories create a collective structure and story that help 
unite people (Nelson, 2003). These effects parallel nostalgic recall’s capacity to engender a 
united, coherent life narrative. Nostalgic recall connects the past with the present by allowing 
people to feel connected to others from their past in the present moment as they recall these 
memories. Engaging in nostalgic recall encourages people to participate in prosocial behaviors 
and take on other’s perspectives through evoking empathy (Zhou, Wildschut, Sedikides, Shi, & 
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Feng, 2012). Sharing autobiographical memories with others can also help people to understand, 
learn about, and bond with the person who is recalling the memory (Fivush et al., 1996). It also 
allows others to provide the person who is recalling the memory with alternative perspectives 
and interpretations of the situation. In this way, autobiographical and memories serve to impart 
information, deepen social ties, and broaden perspectives.  Research examining nostalgic 
memories argues that the collective nature of nostalgic memories serves a bidirectional purpose; 
it strengthens the accessibility of nostalgic memories while also strengthening social bonds with 
others involved in the memoires (Wildschut, Sedikides, Arndt, & Routledge, 2006). Moreover, 
social interactions also serve as a trigger for nostalgia. This cycle, however, may be disrupted in 
depression. Depressed individuals tend to have fewer social interactions (Barger, Messerli-
Bürgy, & Barth, 2014; Cornwell & Waite, 2009; Joiner, Lewinsohn, & Seeley, 2002), which 
would decrease the opportunity for nostalgic memories to be triggered and would also likely 
result in having fewer social memories to encode and later retrieve.  
Directive. 
Capitalizing on the past, the directive effects of nostalgia helps guide present and future 
behaviors as well as problem solving efforts. It also overlaps with both the self and social effects 
of nostalgia. Pillemer (2003) argues that autobiographical memories, such as nostalgic ones, are 
reminders of personal values and serve as pivotal moments when choosing life directions. 
Nostalgic recall also amplifies optimism and self-esteem (Cheung et al., 2013), leaving 
individuals more confident about their ability to take on future challenges. Nostalgic recall serves 
as a built-in defense mechanism that individuals can summon when they experience existential 
threats to mortality and life meaning; nostalgic recall helps to buffer against these threats by 
reducing feelings of meaninglessness and by dissipating distress (Routledge et al., 2011; 
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Routledge, Arndt, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2008), allowing people to maintain a sense of well-
being. Supporting this idea, he meaning maintenance model asserts that people possess an 
inherent need for meaning and that when personal meaning, self-esteem, social acceptance, or 
mortality are challenged, people engage in “fluid compensation.”  They turned to antithetical 
memories and interpretations of themselves to restore meaning and buttress positive self-views 
(Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006).  
In synthesizing past literature, D’Argembeau, Lardi, and Van der Linden (2012) argue 
that when people organize and recall their memoires, they derive meaning and knowledge about 
themselves, their own attributes/abilities, the world, and their relationship with others. These 
lessons help guide people’s generation of conceivable future goals, outcomes, and events while 
also shaping the scope of what they feel is possible for the future. D’Argembeau and colleagues 
contend that people selectively recall and assemble representations of themselves and the future 
that are congruent with their future goals. Thus, there is a cyclical interaction between memories 
of past events and how they shape people’s present self-concept and beliefs about future self-
efficacy. Self-efficacy, which nostalgic recall bolsters (Stephan et al., 2014), has been shown to 
predict more successful future outcomes (Buckelew et al., 1996; Lane et al., 2004; Multon, 
Brown, & Lent, 1991). This finding suggests that recalling positive memories of the self helps to 
generate future successes and more positive memories to draw on in the future. Conversely, 
individuals with lower perceived self-efficacy tend to filter events through a negative lens, as is 
the case in depression. Engaging in nostalgic recall for these individuals may serve to perpetuate 
and reinforce negative self-views and outcomes.   
As a specific kind of autobiographical memory, nostalgic recall, much like 
autobiographical recall, has multifaceted effects. It influences self-conceptualization, social 
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relationships, future goals, and future perceptions of one’s self. It can confer these effects and 
buffer against threats by boosting self-esteem and resilience, reinforcing self-continuity and 
sense of meaning, and facilitating social connectedness. Many of the areas in which nostalgia 
generates positive effects are areas that depression impacts, making nostalgic recall a potentially 
potent tool for fighting depression. However, given the cognitive and attentional biases present 
in depression, it may be difficult for depressed individuals to garner benefits from nostalgia by 
itself. The next sections of this paper will outline the cognitive and attentional biases in 
depression and how they could impact the effects of nostalgic recall as well as why mindfulness 
may be a way to help bridge these biases and allow nostalgic recall to be a beneficial tool for 
people with depression. 
Depression 
To understand how depressive symptomology may mediate the benefits of nostalgic 
recall, it is necessary to outline the cognitive patterns and attentional biases associated with 
depression. Diagnostic features of depression include, low mood, thoughts of worthlessness, 
difficulty concentrating or making decisions, and decreased interest and pleasure in activities 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). In depression, the mind fixates and perseverates on 
negative mood states. This perseverative focus compromises individuals’ ability to engage in 
problem solving efforts or efforts to distract themselves from this negative mood state (Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). In addition, depression is associated with a negative self-focus and 
attentional bias to negative, mood congruent information as well as over-general memories of 
past events. For the purposes of this discussion, this project focuses on how depressive cognitive 
and attentional styles are related to the three primary effects of nostalgia (i.e., self, social, and 
directive). Two common frameworks used to describe depression are Beck’s cognitive triad 
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(Clark & Beck, 1999) and the depressive attributional style (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 
1978; Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & von Baeyer, 1979). Beck’s model characterizes the 
cognitions that accompany depression as negative thoughts about the self, the world, and the 
future. The depressive attributional style is the tendency for depressed individuals to see their 
condition as a product of their own fault (i.e. internal), stable over time, and affecting multiple 
domains of their life (i.e. global). Thus, both models share similar ideas about the internalized 
negative self-focus, the stable, hopeless outlook on the future, and the pervasiveness of the 
cognitive bias across domains that shape worldviews. 
Self-Conceptualization  
 Engaging in nostalgic experiences help individuals create meaning in their lives and 
weave a coherent life story that reaffirms positive aspects of the self. They also help raise self-
esteem. This positive view starkly contrasts how the self is conceptualized in depression. 
Worthlessness is a key diagnostic feature of depression as is low self-esteem. The link between 
depression and low self-esteem has long been established (Battle, 1978), and a meta-analysis has 
confirmed that the relationship between the two is bidirectional, meaning that lower levels of 
self-esteem can also predict depression (Sowislo & Orth, 2013). Much in the same way that 
remembering nostalgic events enhances self-esteem and healthy coping, contingencies of self-
worth have negative effects in depression. Depressed individuals often gauge their self-worth 
from the outcomes of external events that are outside of individuals’ control, rather than the more 
adaptive strategy of gauging their self-worth from the aspects of an event that they have control 
over. Given the unpredictable nature of external events, this maladaptive strategy leads to lability 
in self-esteem, rumination, feelings of helplessness, and depression vulnerability (Crocker, 
2002).  Nostalgia literature suggests that engaging in nostalgic recall can reduce extrinsic self-
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focus, but that this effect is lessened when people were prompted to consider external influences 
during their recall.  Extrinsic self-focus was also negatively associated with state nostalgia 
(Baldwin, Biernat, & Landau, 2014).  Thus, due to their tendency to focus on external events, 
depressed individuals may be likely to report lower levels of state nostalgia and are unlikely to 
see the same reduction in extrinsic self-focus as non-depressed individuals. Furthermore, when 
external events turn out unfavorably, depressed individuals often feel powerless. Feelings of 
helplessness can result in lower perceived self-efficacy (Bandura, Pastorelli, Barbaranelli, & 
Caprara, 1999; Maciejewski, Prigerson, & Mazure, 2000) and are in line with Abramowitz’s 
attributional model of depression.  
Abramowitz’s model argues that individuals possess a perceived external locus of control 
in depression (Abramowitz, 1969; Benassi, Sweeney, & Dufour, 1988). This suggests that 
depressed individuals evaluate their worth, and ability to attain goals, and ability to affect change 
in the future as low, leaving them feeling powerless. Interestingly, although individuals with 
depression generally see events as outside of their control, they see themselves to blame for 
failures (Abramson & Sackheim, 1977). They adopt an internal attributional style for explaining 
the cause of negative events (Peterson & Seligman, 1984) and personalize unfavorable outcomes. 
This internalized, self-critical attribution style is consistent with the ruminative thought pattern 
that often accompanies depression. Trapnell and Campbell conceptualize rumination as a “self-
attentiveness motivated by perceived threats, losses, or injustices to the self” (1999, p. 297). 
Work from Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1985) supports this argument, finding that depressed 
individuals prefer to engage in self-focus after failure, which over time, leads to individuals 
blaming themselves for these shortcomings (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). This paradoxical 
relationship between individuals’ view of themselves as helpless, yet to blame for failure makes 
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it easy to see how feelings of worthlessness emerge in depression. It also illustrates how 
depressed individuals filter their world through negative schemas, paying greater attention to 
negative events.    
Attentional Bias 
 The selective attentional bias present in depression helps formulate and support the 
paradoxical view of low perceived control and a high belief in responsibility for negative 
outcomes. Individuals with depression possess undesirable cognitive biases that are derived from 
cognitive appraisal errors and overgeneralizations of event outcomes (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & 
Emery, 1987). Depressed individuals selectively filter out information that is inconsistent with 
their existing beliefs while demonstrating a heightened attention to negative, mood-congruent 
information (Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 2004; Ilardi, Atchley, Enloe, Kwasny, & 
Garratt, 2007). As a part of the cognitive distortions that Beck describes (1967), depressed 
individuals often minimize or discount positive information that is inconsistent with their views. 
They instead tend to focus on aspects of situations that support their negative beliefs, making 
these beliefs more stable over time and difficult to change. This bias helps reconfirm and 
perpetuate their maladaptive views about themselves and the world. Depression is also 
accompanied by a heighten self-focus (Ingram & Smith, 1984; Mor & Winquist, 2002). The 
combination of this negativity bias and self-focus are the foundation for the perseverative self-
focus after failure (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1985) and internalization of blame (Pyszczynski 
& Greenberg, 1987). The more negative life events a depressed individual faces, the more likely 
they are to attribute these events to their character as a person, rather than the situation or their 
behavior at a particular moment. As a result, when depressed individuals blame their character 
for the causes of negative outcomes, they see these attributions as more stable and global than 
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when they attribute negative events to their behavior (Peterson, Schwartz, & Seligman, 1981). 
This is problematic because this type of maladaptive, assimilated self-attribution engenders 
cognitive dissonance through highlighting the divergence between the perceived self (a failure) 
and the ideal self (successful). 
 Cognitive dissonance is typically minimized in non-depressed people through redirecting 
attention to more positive thoughts such as nostalgic memories or through reappraising the event 
(De Raedt & Koster, 2010). However, awareness of discrepancies between people’s view of who 
they are and who they want to be can also trigger rumination. In depression, individuals are 
unable to easily disengage attention from this negative, analytical, self-focused ruminative style. 
For this reason, these depressotypic ruminations are hypothesized to be a result of dysfunction in 
cognitive control (Joormann & Gotlib, 2010; Joormann, Yoon, & Zetsche, 2007; Koster, De 
Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011). Higher levels of rumination also play a role in the 
development of more passive coping styles, which exacerbate depressive symptoms (Marroquín, 
Fontes, Scilletta, & Miranda, 2010). The style of focus (ruminative versus reflective) people 
adopt when thinking about low mood states influences memory recall. People who ruminate are 
likely to recall negative, mood-congruent memories, which keeps them in a low mood state, 
whereas people who take on a reflective style are more likely to recall positive, mood-
incongruent memories (McFarland & Buehler, 1998), which can help them transition out of a 
low mood state.  
Rumination is a self-perpetuating process, in which attempts at emotional suppression 
through strategies such as overgeneralization lead to avoidance. Avoidance subsequently 
prevents opportunities for the formulation of new, potentially adaptive explanations and 
attributions (Watkins & Teasdale, 2004). Instead, depressed individuals get mired in a cognitive 
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loop in which they try to make sense of past difficulties and unresolved discrepancies in order to 
create a cohesive self-narrative, but fail due to their rigid, analytical cognitive schemas. 
Individuals who are prone to brood on these self-discrepancies show a decrease in 
autobiographical memory specificity, suggesting that they create over-general memories of the 
past (Schoofs, Hermans, Griffith, & Raes, 2013) in an attempt to regulate emotions by avoiding 
unpleasant emotions. This maladaptive coping mechanism may have important implications for 
how depressive symptoms may impact the effects of nostalgic recall.   
Cognitive Biases 
Overgeneralization and autobiographical memory specificity.  
The connection between rumination and overgeneralized memories in depression has 
been well researched. Several studies have linked reduced autographical memory specificity to 
depression course and severity (e.g., Brittlebank et al., 1993; Gibbs & Rude, 2004; Kuyken & 
Dalgleish, 2011; Park et al., 2002; Van Daele, Griffith, Van den Bergh, & Hermans, 2014; 
Williams et al., 2007). Additional work has demonstrated that rumination plays a mediating role 
in this relationship (Raes et al., 2006; Schoofs, Hermans, Griffith, & Raes, 2013; Watkins & 
Teasdale, 2001). This implies that higher levels of rumination lead to reduced specificity in 
autobiographical memory and greater depressive symptomology. Moreover, cognitive style is 
another factor that can affect both memory specificity and mood. Higher levels of self-focused 
attention lead to negative mood states. This is particularly true of individuals with more 
analytical self-focused thinking styles, consistent with rumination (as compared to individuals 
with more experiential self-focused thinking styles, consistent with reflection). This thinking 
style is associated with greater overgeneralization in memories (Watkins & Teasdale, 2001).  
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Overgeneralization and rumination are key aspect of depression’s maladaptive cognitive 
structure. They impact individuals’ views of self, the world, and others as well as the way in 
which they remember information. Beck (1967) argues that depressed individuals tend to 
discount and minimize successes while they perceive failures as representative of global self-
attributes. This would then suggest that depressed individuals may have fewer positive memories 
to draw upon, and the ones they do possess may be vague sketches of events rather than rich, 
vivid memories, potentially limiting the effectiveness of nostalgic recall as a coping for 
depressed individuals.  
These cognitive biases accompanying depression have important implications for 
depressed individuals’ view of the present and of the future. Cognitive distortions not only 
reaffirm depressed individuals’ views of themselves as worthless, but also contribute to feelings 
of helplessness as depressed individuals see themselves as a failure across multiple domains of 
life. This view limits the scope of what they see as possible for themselves in the future and 
predicts depressive symptom severity over time (Smith, Christensen, Peck, & Ward, 1994). 
Furthermore, overgeneralization can lead to catastrophizing about future events (Beck et al., 
1987; Ellis, 1962).  
Catastrophizing. 
Catastrophizing is defined as possessing an irrationally negative view of the future that 
can be triggered by feelings of helplessness and vulnerability, both of which are present in 
depression. Individuals who are prone to catastrophizing see threats as looming in the future 
(Riskind & Williams, 1999). This exaggeratedly negative conceptualization of the future links to 
other aspects of the depressotypic cognitive style. In the development and validation of the Pain 
Catastrophizing Scale, factor analysis produced three second-order factors that comprise 
 22 
catastrophizing: magnifying, ruminating, and helplessness (Sullivan, Bishop, & Pivik, 1995). 
The magnification of threat mirrors overgeneralization through misconstruing and overvaluing 
the data obtained from a given situation. This magnification makes threat feel more universal 
than it actually is and amplifies perceived future threats. Once negative thoughts and attributions 
are formed, rumination renders individuals unable to inhibit these negative thoughts. Feelings of 
helplessness, as discussed earlier, are associated with low self-efficacy and a perceived inability 
to change the situation. These three constructs that underlie catastrophization contribute to stable 
attributions about the future observed in depression; depressed individuals ruminate on negative 
events, making them feel ever-present; the see the future as hopeless; and see themselves as 
unable to change this gloomy prospect (Kovacs & Beck, 1978). Moreover, this rigid, pessimistic 
style of thinking impairs problem solving and the ability to generate novel solutions or 
alternative explanations that could potentially challenge these cognitive biases. In both healthy 
and depressotypic views of the future, individuals rely on past perceptions of the self to guide 
behavior. The directive effects of nostalgic recall can help highlight past successes that reinforce 
self-efficacy and serve as a knowledge base for problem solving that healthy individuals can 
draw upon, giving them a more hopeful view of the present and future. However, depressed 
individuals may not be able to disengage from their ruminative focus to overcome their 
catastrophized views of the future. They may also have less vivid and fewer positive memories to 
draw upon. These memories may highlight discrepancies between a positive past self and a 
depressed current self, creating dissonance. For these reasons, depressed individuals may have a 
limited ability to access the directive effects of nostalgia.  
Problem solving.   
Problem-solving ability in depression is important to include in this discussion not only 
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because depression impairs problems-solving ability, but also because it relates to the directive 
effects of nostalgia. The directive effects of nostalgia posit that nostalgic recall fosters emotion 
regulation. It does so by moving attention away from negative emotions and directing it toward 
reappraising an event in the context of positive emotions, and by helping to guide problem-
solving and future planning (Holland & Kensinger, 2010).  This aspect of nostalgia’s effects 
becomes limited in a depressed population as depressed individuals exhibit deficits in their 
ability to reappraise events and refocus attention. The diminished ability to disengage attention 
from negative self-focused thoughts is a defining feature of depression. As outlined in the 
discussion of rumination, depression has often been classified as a problem with disengaging 
attention from negative self-focused thoughts. The impaired disengagement hypothesis (Koster 
et al., 2011) asserts that depressed individuals possess low attentional control and subsequently 
struggle to turn their attention away from rumination and to adaptive emotion regulation skills 
such as distraction or reappraisal, both of which can be facilitated through nostalgic recall. This 
difficulty with this disengagement leads to reduced efficacy in problem-solving efforts and 
difficulty with task performance (e.g., Brown & Watkins, 2002; Meiran, Diamond, Toder, & 
Nemets, 2011; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). These deficits are important for two reasons: first, 
poor task performance provides depressed individuals with data that reaffirms their notion of 
themselves as inefficacious and can perpetuate rumination; second, impaired problem-solving 
and prolonged focus on negative information engenders a stable attribution about the future as 
hopeless.  
Studies on rumination and executive function in depressed individuals suggest a 
mechanism for the observed problem solving difficulties. Depressed individuals have greater 
difficulties in switching tasks, reflecting deficits in attentional disengagement. When considering 
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rumination, depressed individuals show a worse ability to update working memory and an 
impaired ability to integrate information needed to plan and be successful at achieving a goal 
(Meiran, Diamond, Toder, & Nemets, 2011). Rumination and frequency of thoughts are 
unrelated to a given task predict task performance. Under high and low levels of cognitive load, 
rumination negatively predicts ability to attend to and identify target stimuli. Rumination also 
predicts slower reaction times and along with negative mood, predicts difficulty with response 
inhibition (Brinker, Campisi, Gibbs, & Izzard, 2013). Depressed individuals also show 
impairments in removing unnecessary information and in preventing negative information from 
entering and remaining in working memory (Gohier et al., 2009; Joormann & Gotlib, 2010; 
Joormann, Yoon, & Zetsche, 2007). Joorman & Gotlib (2010) argue that these deficiencies in 
inhibition help explain the difficulties with emotion regulation observed in depression. Negative 
mood can trigger depressotypic thoughts and rumination. To ameliorate mood and disrupt this 
cycle, individuals need to possess good control over the content of their working memory. Thus, 
an inability to prevent or remove negative, mood-congruent information that is often irrelevant 
for the task at hand from entering or remaining in working memory is problematic. It leads to 
rumination, prolonged negative mood, attention deficits, and cognitive slowness as these 
negative thoughts deplete cognitive resources.  
Neuroimaging data corroborate these behavioral findings, demonstrating aberrant brain 
activity during working memory tasks. One study found that while depressed individuals are able 
to perform at levels commensurate with health controls on working memory tasks, they exhibit 
greater activity in the dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC) during these tasks (Harvey et al., 2005; Matsuo et al., 2006). The dlPFC is an area of the 
brain that is responsible for executive function and working memory. The ACC also plays a role 
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in executive function and working memory as well as in attention inhibition, resolution of 
cognitive conflict or dissonance, and affect regulation. Taken together, these findings suggest 
that depression leads to impaired cognitive capacity through consumption of cognitive resources. 
In order to maintain task performance, depressed individuals have to exert additional cognitive 
effort, resulting in fatigue and decreased task performance over time (Harvey et al., 2005).    
Marazziti, Consoli, Picchetti, Carlini, & Faravelli (2010) contend that the memory 
deficits in depression are secondary to attention problems. One result they found supporting this 
argument was that depressed individuals have a harder time than non-depressed individuals 
transferring information from short-term to long-term memory and have impaired task and 
problem-solving planning. The combination of several cognitive factors may explain the 
overgeneralized memories that accompany depression: 1) difficulty encoding information into 
long-term memory 2) difficulty inhibiting negative cognitions 3) prolonged rumination’s 
consumption of cognitive resources and 4) lower salience of positive information. The difficulty 
encoding information in depression could interfere with the storing and subsequent retrieval of 
nostalgic events due to the average age of onset of depression.  Three-fourths of lifetime cases of 
depression start by age 24 and the average age of onset for depression is 30 years of age (Kessler 
et al., 2005).  This window coincides with the “reminiscence bump,” the period of time during 
which most people report experiencing their most important life events, which are likely targets 
for nostalgic recall (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004; Rubin & Berntsen, 2003).  Furthermore, given the 
chronicity that characterizes depression with a 35% recurrence rate (Eaton et al., 2008; 
Hardeveld, Spijker, De Graaf, Nolen, & Beekman, 2010), it is possible that individuals could 
also have depression later in life when trying to recall memories from the past.  These deficits 
potentially limit the ability to encode nostalgic events and subsequently recall them. This 
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difficulty in turn affects problem-solving through hampering the directive effects of nostalgia. It 
limits individuals’ ability to harness the knowledge gleaned from past experiences and successes 
to solve current problems and plan for the future. 
The attentional problems that Marazziti and colleagues argue lead to memory deficits in 
depression may be linked to rumination by playing a role in the diminished capacity for task 
planning and problem solving. Watkins and Teasdale (2001) examined the effects of attentional 
style on memory specificity by comparing highly self-focused analytical attention styles (i.e., 
ruminative) to low self-focused experiential attention styles (i.e., reflective) and found that the 
highly self-focused analytical style reduced autobiographical memory specificity. Successive 
work in this line of research has examined how these two types of attentional styles impact self-
worth and social problem solving. Abstract, analytical styles are more evaluative and self-
focused. They predict an increase in feelings of worthlessness (Rimes & Watkins, 2005) and a 
decreased ability to solve social problems (Watkins & Moulds, 2005). Thus, both nostalgic recall 
and depression have broad reaching effects across similar cognitive and social domains but in 
opposite directions: nostalgic recall helps bolster these areas, whereas depression hinders them. 
Proposed Interaction between Effects of Nostalgia and Depression 
Engaging in nostalgic recall helps construct a continuous self-narrative, brings in outside 
perspectives through increasing social engagement, aids individuals in problem solving, and 
heightens hope for the future. These potential effects would be advantageous for depressed 
individuals, who struggle with low self-efficacy, social isolation, hopelessness, and difficulty 
escaping their ruminative thoughts. However, minimal research to date has examined whether 
engaging in nostalgic recall has the same effects in depressed individuals as non-depressed 
individuals. One study examining the effects of nostalgia in habitual worriers found that 
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nostalgia amplifies symptoms of depression and anxiety (Verplanken, 2012). Thus, it is possible 
that the cognitive and attentional biases that accompany depression could affect the specificity 
and emotional quality of the nostalgic memories depressed individuals recall as well as 
depressed individual’s ability to fully immerse themselves in the nostalgic experience.  
Subsequently, these differences may restrict nostalgic memory’s ability to promote the 
aforementioned traits associated with psychological well-being. By selectively filtering 
information according to their negative self-schema, depressed individuals tend to take in more 
critical information about themselves and have difficulty disengaging attention from 
perseverative rumination. In this way, depressed individuals likely miss many of the positive 
moments in life, absorbed in their search for information that reinforces their pessimistic views. 
Rehashing past failures diminishes working memory, reduces ability to translate information 
from short-term to long-term memory, and consumes the cognitive resources that would 
ordinarily allow depressed individuals to focus on their present experience. The combination of 
highlighting negative information and a diminished ability to extricate themselves from their 
internal dialogue leaves depressed individuals less equipped to encode and retrieve nostalgic 
memories. This raises questions as to whether recalling overgeneralized, generic memories 
possesses the same capability of producing the same effects as recalling distinct, vivid nostalgic 
memories.  
These cognitive and attentional biases also lead to a cascade of negative consequences 
that may interfere with nostalgia’s effects. Among these disruptive beliefs and behaviors are 
lower perceived self-efficacy, catastrophizing about the future, and a diminished ability to 
engage in problem solving. The directive effects of nostalgia have the potential to counteract 
these unfavorable characteristics. However, depressed individuals would need to harness greater 
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cognitive flexibility and cognitive inhibition to generate multiple future outcomes, encompassing 
a spectrum of possible future scenarios, rather than becoming stymied by only considering 
ruinous prospects. Greater flexibility and inhibition would allow them to engender a more 
hopeful view of the future and see themselves as more efficacious. Given that individuals with 
depression struggle with many areas nostalgic recall positively affects, it is possible that 
nostalgic recall could be a powerful adjunctive therapeutic tool in depression treatment if there 
was a way to assuage these attentional and cognitive biases inherent to depressogenic thinking.  
Application of Mindfulness 
Research exploring depression’s effects on nostalgia’s ability to promote well-being 
could deepen the current understanding of factors that impact depression. If findings in depressed 
populations are consistent with those in healthy populations, then nostalgic recall may be 
considered for use as a therapeutic aid. If findings in depressed populations reveal that 
depression and its cognitive and attentional biases interfere with nostalgia’s capacity to 
embolden coping, as this paper contends, then mitigating these tendencies should restore 
nostalgia’s advantageous outcomes. The growing literature on mindfulness based interventions 
suggests that engaging in mindfulness practice may be a way to lessen these depressogenic 
biases. 
Mindfulness promotes disciplined attention to the current moment in an objective, 
accepting manner (Bishop et al., 2004). Mindfulness practices typically carried out in a quiet 
setting and ask individuals to sit upright in their chair, close their eyes, and focus their attention 
on a particular topic or sensation, such as one’s breath.  People are encouraged to return their 
attention back to their point of focus each time they notice it wandering.  In depressed 
populations, mindfulness based interventions decrease depressive and anxiety-related symptoms 
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(Barnhofer et al., 2009; Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt, & Oh, 2010), help prevent relapse, and improve 
quality of life (Kuyken et al., 2008). They also improve distress tolerance (Verplanken & Fisher, 
2014), increase autobiographical memory specificity (Heeren et al., 2009), and decrease 
rumination (Baer, 2009; Kingston, Dooley, Bates, Lawlor, & Malone, 2007).  
Research has sought to identity the underlying constructs that mindfulness affects. One 
such construct is over-identification with thoughts and emotions, which is consistent with the 
enmeshed, overgeneralized pattern of ruminative thoughts. In over-identification, individuals 
place more meaning or weight than is warranted on a particular thought or emotion and can see 
the thoughts or emotions as immutable facts.  Dampening over-identification allows individuals 
to take a more balanced, impartial view of unpleasant thoughts and emotions. One study 
examining mindfulness’s mechanism of action found its ability to decrease over-identification 
and self-judgment to be the most robust predictors of changes in symptoms related to depression, 
anxiety, and stress (Van Dam et al., 2014). This result compliments the literature investigating 
self-focused cognitive styles, which found that cognitive styles high in analytical, evaluative self-
focus (e.g., ruminative styles) increase feelings of worthlessness, whereas cognitive styles high 
in experiential, concrete focus (e.g. mindful, reflective styles) did not (Rimes & Watkins, 2005). 
Mindfulness promotes objective problem-focused thinking that is grounded in the present 
experience and prevents individuals from overgeneralizing information (Watkins, Baeyens, & 
Read, 2009). These changes in cognitive style are part of the way mindfulness disrupts and 
reduces rumination. 
Due to their cognitive biases, depressed individuals lack the ability to effectively 
reappraise negative emotions. Attempts to do so often result in rumination and the maintenance 
of negative moods states (Watkins, Moberly, & Moulds, 2008). Teasdale, Segal, and Williams 
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(1995) contend that mindfulness interferes with the automatic replay of pessimistic thoughts and 
reinforcement of undesirable schema by shifting focus away from rumination and to unbiased, 
sensible aspects of individuals’ experiences. In accordance with this finding, subsequent research 
has found that the degree to which mindfulness reduces maladaptive rumination and increases 
adaptive cognitions mediates mindfulness’s efficacy in reducing depressive symptoms (Heeren 
& Philippot, 2011).  Increasing present awareness in lieu of rumination appears to minimize 
negative cognitive and emotional elaboration on an experience, restricting individuals from 
reaffirming negative self-conceptualizations (Farb, Anderson, & Segal, 2012).  
This shift to a more adaptive form of cognitive processing, which mindfulness facilitates, 
improves emotion regulation and decreases emotional avoidance Mindfulness does so by 
enabling individuals to perceive their emotions in an objective, non-threatening way.  These 
effects are important for two reasons. First, decreasing rumination in favor of attending to the 
current experience and increasing tolerance of negative emotions allows for more explicit 
encoding and retrieval of memories, which increases autobiographical memory specificity 
(Heeren et al., 2009; Williams et al., 2000). This frees individuals’ attention from negative self-
focus and allows them to notice a fuller experience, which translates into encoding and 
subsequent retrieval of richer memories. Increased specificity in encoding and retrieval of 
memories sets the foundation for empowering depressed individuals to effectively engage in 
nostalgic recall and possibly obtain the proposed benefits it offers. Second, improved emotion 
regulation nurtures a greater perception of coping and self-efficacy (Luberto, Cotton, McLeish, 
Mingione, & O’Bryan, 2013).  This is useful given that Judge, Erez, Bono, and Thorsen (2002) 
argue that self-esteem, self-efficacy, and locus of control are likely to be part of the same higher 
order construct. This means that increasing self-efficacy should also augment internal locus of 
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control. It stands to reason that greater perceived self-efficacy and internal locus of control 
would help depressed individuals access the directive, problem-solving facet of nostalgic recall. 
Furthermore, mindfulness also increases cognitive and attentional flexibility and cognitive 
inhibition (Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007; Heeren et al., 2009). This should heighten depressed 
individuals’ ability to fully engage in nostalgic recall, which should help them to consider a 
wider range of possible future outcomes and problem solving solutions.  
In summary, mindfulness has been shown to increase cognitive flexibility, decrease 
overgeneralized memories, help depressed individuals shift attention away from ruminative 
thought more easily, and boost self-efficacy. These characteristics may serve to dampen the 
cognitive and attentional biases in depression enough to allow depressed individuals to gain 
additional coping strategies from engaging in nostalgic recall and further improve recovery 
efforts. Exploring the effects of mindfulness on nostalgic recall in depressed individuals could 
help improve our understanding of factors that enhance recovery as well as expand 
mindfulness’s therapeutic applications. 
Present Study 
Given that the vast majority of prior research has examined the relationship between 
nostalgic recall and well-being in healthy populations, more work is needed on the nature of this 
relationship across varying degrees of depressive symptomatology. To address this need, I 
conducted three experiments investigating the moderating effect of depressive symptomology on 
nostalgia’s ability to promote well-being. It also evaluated whether mindfulness can augment the 
benefits to psychological well-being that nostalgic recall can promote. The three experiments 
were completed concurrently. Experiments 1 and 2 compared the effects of nostalgic recall 
(versus an ordinary memory recall, serving as a control condition) across varying degrees of 
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depressive symptomatology in two different populations. Experiment 3 examined the effects of a 
brief mindfulness intervention on the effects of nostalgic recall across varying degrees of 
depressive symptomatology. These three studies examined induced rather than naturally 
occurring nostalgic recall. This approach lays the groundwork for the investigation of the 
efficacy of nostalgic recall as a therapeutic tool.  
Specific Aims and Hypotheses 
The specific aims of this study were to 1) examine depressive symptomology’s impact on 
the effects of nostalgic recall; 2) determine the impact of mindfulness on nostalgic recall 3) 
determine whether greater nostalgia leads to decreases in depressive symptomology and whether 
mindfulness can heighten these effects across varying degrees of depressive symptomatology. 
Aim 1: Examine depressive symptomology’s impact on the effects of nostalgic recall. 
Experiments 1 and 2 and Experiment 3 addressed this aim. As previously described, past 
research has demonstrated that evoking nostalgic memories can promote self-continuity and 
meaning, encourage social connectedness, and direct future planning and behavior. However, the 
impact of mood state on these effects has yet to be fully explored. It is important to understand 
this relationship in order to better treat depression.  
Hypothesis 1a: Main effects –  
-Hypothesis 1a1: Main effect of depressive symptomology on SFNS: Higher 
levels of baseline depressive symptomology should predict lower state levels of nostalgia 
across recall conditions.  
- Hypothesis 1a2: Main effect of recall type on SFNS: Engaging in nostalgic 
recall should predict higher state levels of nostalgia than engaging in an ordinary recall. 
Hypothesis 1b: Interaction –  
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Hypothesis 1b: Two-way interaction between recall condition and baseline levels 
of depressive symptomology: The nostalgic recall group will report higher state levels of 
nostalgia than the ordinary recall group at low levels of baseline depressive 
symptomology.  However, as depressive symptomology increases, the effects of nostalgic 
recall will diminish and the nostalgic recall and ordinary recall groups will report similar 
state levels of nostalgia when higher levels of depressive symptomology are reported. 
Hypotheses for Aim 1 are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Depressive symptomology’s proposed impact on SFNS score. 
Aim 2: Determine whether mindfulness can heighten reported nostalgia (i.e., SFNS 
scores) across varying degrees of depressive symptomatology.  
Experiment 3 investigated this aim. Mindfulness based interventions are known to 
address cognitive and attentional biases in depression. Including a mindfulness based 
intervention provides a way to evaluate the role that these biases play on nostalgic recall’s effects 
as well as a potential way to augment them.  
Hypothesis 2a: Main effect –  
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-Hypothesis 2a: Main effect of mindfulness on SFNS: Engaging in the 
mindfulness intervention should predict increases in state levels of nostalgia, as 
measured by the SFNS, across recall conditions. 
Hypothesis 2b: Interactions –  
- Hypothesis 2b1: Two-way interaction between mindfulness condition and 
baseline levels of depressive symptomology: In the no mindfulness intervention 
condition, higher levels of baseline depressive symptomology will predict lower state 
levels of nostalgia across recall conditions, with the nostalgic recall group showing a 
sharper decline in SFNS scores at higher levels of depressive symptomology than the 
ordinary recall group.  However, in the mindfulness intervention condition, reported state 
levels of nostalgia will not be impacted by the severity of baseline depressive 
symptomology. 
- Hypothesis 2b2: Three-way interaction between baseline levels of depressive 
symptomology, mindfulness condition, and recall condition to predict SFNS: If 
hypothesis 1b is correct, there will be a minimal effect of nostalgic recall among those 
with high levels of baseline depressive symptomology (two-way interaction between 
baseline depressive symptomology and recall condition on SFNS).  Participating in the 
mindfulness intervention should alter this interaction such that participating in the 
mindfulness group should mitigate the effects of baseline depressive symptomology on 
the relationship.  Mindfulness intervention participants in the nostalgic recall condition 
should report higher state levels of nostalgia than those in the ordinary recall group, 
regardless of baseline level of depressive symptomology.  Individuals who do not take 
part in the mindfulness intervention should produce results consistent with hypothesis 1b 
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(i.e., When predicting SFNS, there will be less of a difference between nostalgic recall 
and ordinary recall at higher levels of depression than at lower levels of depressive 
symptomology.)  
Hypotheses for Aim 2 are illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Proposed relationship between mindfulness intervention depressive symptomology and 
SFNS. 
Aim 3: Determine whether nostalgia can decrease depressive symptomology and 
whether mindfulness can have an incremental effect.  
Experiment 3 investigated this aim relating to improvements in depressive 
symptomology. Although it is hypothesized that individuals with higher levels of depressive 
symptomology may not be able to gain the same degree of benefit from engaging in nostalgic 
recall as those with lower levels of symptoms, it is important to investigate whether the benefits 
they do glean can reduce their state level of depressive symptomology.  The measure of the state 
level of nostalgia examines constructs that are related to depression such as social connectedness, 
but is not a measure of depressive symptomology.  Furthermore, mindfulness will be 
investigated as a means to mitigate the effects of depression and enhance the effects of nostalgic 
recall, subsequently leading to greater improvement in depression. 
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Hypothesis 3a: Main effects –  
 -Hypothesis 3a1: Main effect of SNFS on change in state level of depressive 
symptomology: Higher state levels of nostalgia, as measured by the SFNS, should predict 
larger decreases in state depressive symptomology across recall conditions.  It is possible 
that individuals in both the nostalgic and ordinary recall groups may have some level of 
nostalgic experiences when engaging in the recall conditions as both nostalgic and 
ordinary memories are autobiographical ones and share similar impacts (e.g., on self and 
feelings of social connectedness).  However, this main effect is interested in investigating 
the degree to which experienced nostalgia (as indexed by the SFNS) predicts changes in 
state depressive symptomology, regardless of recall condition. 
 -Hypothesis 3a2: Main effect of recall condition on changes in state level of 
depressive symptomology: Overall, participating in nostalgic recall should lead to greater 
decreases in depressive symptomology than engaging in ordinary recall. 
 -Hypothesis 3a3: Main effect of mindfulness condition on changes in state level 
of depressive symptomology: Participating in the mindfulness intervention should lead to 
greater decreases in depressive symptomology across recall conditions.  The mindfulness 
based intervention will reduce state depressive symptomology including rumination and 
negative affect, resulting in decreased depressive symptomology. 
Hypothesis 3b:  Interactions –  
-Hypothesis 3b1: Two-way interaction between recall type and SFNS on changes 
in levels of depressive symptomology: Hypothesis 3b1 examines the interaction between 
recall condition and state levels of nostalgia on changes in state level of depressive 
symptomology.  Although nostalgic and ordinary memories are both autobiographical 
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memories and produce similar effects, nostalgic memories are hypothesized to do so to a 
greater degree.  As such, it is hypothesized that at low state levels of nostalgia, the 
nostalgic and ordinary recall groups will both predict minimal decreases in state levels of 
depression.  As SFNS increases, those in the nostalgic recall group will demonstrate 
greater decreases in state level of depressive symptomology compared to the ordinary 
recall group. 
- Hypothesis 3b2: Two-way interaction between depressive symptomology and 
recall type on changes in levels of depressive symptomology: It is expected that as 
individuals report higher baseline levels of depression, the decrease in depressive 
symptomology resulting from engaging in nostalgic recall will diminish.  Examining 
whether there is an interaction between level of depressive symptomology and recall 
condition will determine whether the individuals with higher levels of depression can still 
benefit from nostalgic recall at in the same way as those with lower levels of depression.  
One possible meaning of a significant interaction is that individuals engaging in nostalgic 
recall who report lower baseline levels of depression would experience greater 
improvement in their depression than individuals with higher baseline levels of 
depression and will look more like individuals participating in the ordinary recall 
condition.  Those in the ordinary recall condition, should report low levels of change in 
depression score, regardless of baseline level of depression.  A non-significant interaction 
with a main effect of recall type would signify all individuals can experience a mood 
boost from engaging in nostalgic recall, regardless of their level of depression.   
-Hypothesis 3b3: Two-way interaction between depressive symptomology and 
SFNS on changes in levels of depressive symptomology: Similar to the interaction 
 38 
between baseline depressive symptomology and recall type, an interaction of baseline 
depressive symptomology with SNFS would have similar meaning as SFNS should vary 
with recall type. 
-Hypothesis 3b4: Three-way interaction between baseline depressive 
symptomology, mindfulness condition, and recall condition:  The relationship proposed 
in the interaction between baseline depressive symptomology and recall condition 
(hypothesis 3b2) is consistent with what is expected in the group who does not participate 
in the mindfulness condition.  However, participating in the mindfulness intervention is 
expected to mitigate the effects of depression, such that the nostalgic recall group should 
report consistent improvements in depression, regardless of baseline levels of depression 
and these improvements will be greater than those reported by those in the ordinary recall 
group.  Both the nostalgic and the ordinary recall groups are expected to report greater 
improvement in depression in the mindfulness group than in the group who did not 
participate in the mindfulness intervention as mindfulness has been demonstrated to 
decrease depression symptoms in numerous studies (e.g., Barnhofer et al., 2009; Deyo, 
Wilson, Ong, & Koopman, 2009; Hofmann et al., 2010; Wu, Shi, Xia, & Lu, 2013) 
-Hypothesis 3b5: Three-way interaction between baseline depressive 
symptomology, mindfulness condition, and SFNS on changes in levels of depressive 
symptomology: Expectations of this 3-way interaction are similar to those expected in the 
3-way interaction between baseline depressive symptomology, mindfulness condition, 
and recall condition, because SFNS and recall should be highly related.  The expected 
effect of baseline depressive symptomology on SFNS in the no mindfulness intervention 
condition should diminish in the mindfulness intervention condition. 
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Hypotheses for Aim 3 are illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.  Proposed effects of mindfulness and nostalgia on level of depressive symptomology. 
Method 
Participants 
Experiment 1. Two hundred two participants were recruited to participate in this online 
study through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) website. Two participants were excluded 
from analyses as they reported that English was not their first language, leaving a final sample 
size of 200.  Table 1 summarizes the demographic information of the sample. Ninety-nine 
participants were randomly assigned to the control condition, during which they were asked to 
recall an ordinary event, and 101 participants were randomly assigned to the nostalgic recall 
condition. Participants received $1.25 for participating in the study. MTurk has been shown to be 
an effective tool to reach clinical populations. It provides samples with a range of depressive 
symptomology comparable to that of the general population (Shapiro, Chandler, & Mueller, 
2013). Given the differences in report of depressive symptomology across cultures (e.g., Draguns 
& Tanaka-Matsumi, 2003; Ryder et al., 2008), non-native English speakers were excluded.  
However, this study did not screen for county of origin and of citizenship. 
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Table 1 
Demographics of the Sample 
  Expt. 1 (n = 200) Expt. 2 (n = 200) Expt. 3 (n = 473) 
% Men 49 (n = 98) 30.5 (n = 61) 48.4 (n = 229) 
Mean age 35.66 (11.54) 18.76 (1.31) 18.86 (1.41) 
Mean age in memory Ord = 32.22 (12.13) 
Nost = 19.99 (10.69) 
Ord = 17.65 (2.66) 
Nost = 14.61 (4.62) 
Ord = 17.60 (2.79) 
Nost = 14.30 (4.60) 
Mean education (yrs) 15.31 (3.25) 13.15 (1.42) 12.89 (1.24) 
Ethnicity       
% Caucasian 76.5 88.5 82.2 
% Asian 10 3.5 4.2 
% African America 7 2.5 7.0 
% Hispanic/Latino 5.5 3.5 3.0 
% Middle Eastern 0 0.5 0.6 
% Other 1 1.5 2.9 
Note: Ord = ordinary recall, Nost = nostalgic recall. 
Experiment 2. Two hundred twelve participants from undergraduate psychology classes 
at the University of Kansas were recruited to participate in this online study. Twelve participants 
were excluded from analysis due to exiting the study on Qualtrics prior to completion, leaving a 
sample size of two hundred.  Listwise exclusion of incomplete responses comprised 5.6% of the 
data, which is well within the range of data exclusion that is thought to be inconsequential for 
statistical analysis (Dong & Peng, 2013).  Table 1 describes the sample’s demographic 
characteristics. One hundred participants were randomly assigned to the control condition, 
during which they recalled an ordinary event, and 100 participants were randomly assigned to 
the nostalgic recall condition, during which they recalled a nostalgic memory. Participants 
received course credit for participating in this study. Participants were excluded if they had taken 
part in Experiment 3 of this project. Given the differences in report of depressive symptomology 
across cultures (e.g., Draguns & Tanaka-Matsumi, 2003; Ryder et al., 2008), non-native English 
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speakers were also excluded from this experiment.  However, this study did not screen for 
county of origin and of citizenship. 
Experiment 3. Four hundred seventy-three participants from undergraduate psychology 
classes at the University of Kansas were recruited to participate in this in-person study.  Table 1 
summarizes the demographic characteristics of this sample. Two hundred sixty-one participants 
were randomly assigned to the brief mindfulness intervention.  Fifteen participants were 
excluded due to technical difficulties with the survey as it timed out during the mindfulness 
intervention, leaving a sample size of 246.  Listwise exclusion of incomplete responses 
comprised 5.7% of the data, which is well within the range of data exclusion that is thought to be 
inconsequential for statistical analysis (Dong & Peng, 2013).  Of these participants, 123 were 
randomly assigned to complete the ordinary recall and 123 were randomly assigned to complete 
the nostalgic recall.  As was the case in Experiments 1 and 2, there was a group of participants 
who only completed the recall condition, but not the brief mindfulness intervention.  This group, 
who did not engage in the brief mindfulness intervention, was comprised of 233 participants.  Of 
the 233 participants, six were excluded from analysis due to exiting the study on Qualtrics prior 
to completion, leaving a sample size of 227.  Of these participants, 115 were randomly assigned 
to complete a nostalgic recall and 112 were randomly assigned to complete an ordinary recall. 
Including groups that replicated the nostalgic recall and ordinary recall conditions from 
Experiments 1 and 2 served as way to examine whether there were any differences in the effects 
of nostalgia due to completing the recall in a laboratory setting versus completing the recall in an 
online setting. Participants received course credit for participating in this study. Experiment 3 
used the same selection criteria as Experiments 1 and 2, with the exception that participants were 
excluded from Experiment 3 if they have taken part in Experiment 2 of this study. Non-native 
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English speakers were excluded again due to cultural difference in depression presentation and to 
ensure that all participants could fully understand and engage in the brief mindfulness 
intervention in this experiment.  However, this study did not screen for county of origin and of 
citizenship.    
Procedure 
Experiment 1 and 2. 
For Experiment 1, participants were recruited through Amazon’s MTurk. For Experiment 
2, participants were recruited from an introductory psychology class at the University of Kansas. 
Both experiments were conducted online and data was collected via Qualtrics. After completing 
informed consent, participants provided demographic information and completed a PANAS, the 
MDAS, and the RRQ. Completing these measures at the start of the study provided a baseline 
measurement of mood and prevented the nostalgia manipulation from influencing these scores. 
Next, participants assigned to the nostalgic recall condition engaged in nostalgic recall. In line 
with prior research on nostalgia (e.g., Baldwin & Landau, 2014; Hepper et al., 2012; Routledge 
et al., 2008; Wildschut et al., 2006; Zhou, Wildschut, Sedikides, Chen, & Vingerhoets, 2012), 
participants were provided with the New Oxford Dictionary of English (1998) definition of 
nostalgia (“sentimental longing or wistful affection for the past”) and asked to think of a 
nostalgic event from their past (Prompt in Appendix D). They then identified and recorded four 
keywords from that event and provided a brief description of the event and how it made them 
feel. Participants assigned to the control condition were given an identical task, but asked to 
write about an everyday, ordinary experience rather than nostalgic one (Prompt in Appendix D). 
Following this recall, all participants completed a manipulation check and measures of the 
constructs linked to the previously established effects of nostalgia (SFNS, SCS, NGSE, and 
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SCCS). Consistent with the procedure implemented by Verplanken (2012), participants 
identified and record their most positive attribute to offset any possible negative feelings the 
study evoked by asking about depression. All participants were debriefed at the conclusion of the 
study.  Table 2 provides a summary of this procedure.  
Table 2 
Summary of Design for Experiments 
Experiment 
    Condition 
 





















Expt. 1 200 Online General  
  Nostalgic      101   X  X   X 
  Control (Ord.) 99   X   X  X 
Expt. 2 200 Online Under-
grad 
 
  Nostalgic      100   X  X   X 
  Control (Ord.) 100   X   X  X 
Expt. 3 473 Lab Under-
grad 
 
  Mindful/Nost. 123   X X X  X X 
  Mindful/Ord. 123   X X  X X X 
  Nostalgic 115   X  X  X X 
  Control (Ord.) 112   X   X X X 
Note: Demo = demographic, Dep Sx Scales = Depressive symptomology (Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule (PANAS), Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ), Multidimensional 
Depression Assessment Scale), Nost = nostalgia, Mindful = mindfulness, and Ord. = ordinary, 
TMS = Toronto Mindfulness Scale, Nost scales = State Functions of Nostalgia Scale, Social 
Connectedness Scale, Self-Concept Clarity Scale, New General Self-Efficacy Scale. 
  
Experiment 3.  
This experiment was conducted in-person in classrooms at the University of Kansas. An 
in-person lab study was chosen for this experiment because, although, research suggests that 
results from traditional convince samples are nearly indistinguishable from online samples (e.g., 
Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013; Krupnikov & Levine, 2014; Weinberg, Freese, & McElhattan, 
2014), Krupnikov and Levine (2014) found that studies requiring greater participant engagement 
varied in results between in-person and online formats. Thus, since this experiment included a 
 44 
brief mindfulness intervention, an in-person design was implemented to help increase the 
likelihood of participant engagement during this intervention. Additionally, one group of 
participants in Experiment 3 completed the same nostalgic recall condition described in 
Experiments 1 and 2 and one group completed the same ordinary recall condition described in 
Experiments 1 and 2 but in an in-person format rather than online. While this project expected 
the online and in-person designs to produce consistent results, the inclusion of these groups in 
Experiment 3 facilitated replication and confirmation of findings from Experiments 1 and 2 and 
allowed for a direct comparison between online and in-person data collection methods. 
As in Experiment 2, participants were recruited from psychology classes at the University 
of Kansas. Participants completed the experiment in groups of approximately eight people at a 
time. Each group of participants was randomly assigned to receive either a brief mindfulness 
intervention prior to engaging in memory recall (nostalgic or ordinary) or to complete the 
memory recall (nostalgic or ordinary) without having completed the mindfulness intervention.   
After completing informed consent, participants provided demographic information and 
completed a PANAS, the MDAS, and the RRQ. Participants assigned to the to the brief 
mindfulness intervention/ordinary recall condition and participants assigned to the brief 
mindfulness intervention/nostalgic recall condition then completed the brief mindfulness 
induction. For this induction, the experimenter played a 15-minute recorded, focused breathing 
mindfulness exercise based off Kabat-Zinn’s (1990) Mindfulness Based Cognitive Stress 
Reduction program and that mirrors the methodology of Arch & Craske (2006). This 
intervention directed participants to focus their attention and awareness to their sensations and 
experience of breathing. Participants assigned to the nostalgic recall condition or ordinary recall 
condition without the mindfulness induction did not complete the mindfulness intervention. They 
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completed the nostalgic or ordinary recall after providing demographic information and 
completing a PANAS, the MDAS, and the RRQ. Groups of participants assigned to the 
mindfulness intervention completed the nostalgic or ordinary recall following the brief 
mindfulness intervention. All participants provided a description of their memory and completed 
the manipulation check as outlined in Experiments 1 and 2. All participants completed a second 
PANAS and RRQ as well as the TMS and the measures of constructs related to previously 
established effects of nostalgia (SFNS, SCS, NGSE, and SCCS). Participants also identified their 
most positive attribute and were debriefed at the conclusion of the study.  Table 2 provides a 
summary of this procedure.  
Measures 
Demographic Data. Participants reported their current age, education, gender, and 
ethnicity. 
 Mood and Depression: 
 Multidimensional Depression Assessment Scale (MDAS). The Multidimensional 
Depression Assessment Scale is a 48-item self-report measure of depression. The four subscales 
of this instrument (i.e., Emotional, Cognitive, Somatic, and Interpersonal) offer greater ability 
than measures such as Beck’s Depression Inventory to classify depression symptomology as this 
study argues that cognitive symptoms may play a large role in variation of effects of nostalgic 
recall. The MDAS has established high reliability (α = 0.87) and good convergent validity with 
other widely used depression measures (Cheung & Power, 2012). 
 Rumination-Reflection Questionnaire (RRQ). The RRQ is a 24-item self-report measure 
with two subscales: ruminative self-focus and reflective self-focus. This measure has high 
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reliability with coefficient alpha of 0.90 and 0.91 for the rumination and reflection components 
respectively (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). The PANAS is a commonly 
administered 20-item self-report measure of affect, on which participants rate mood related 
adjectives on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all, 5 = extremely). The instrument has validity for 
measuring distress, depression, and anxiety and has reported reliability between 0.84 to 0.90 
(Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Two mood scales (positive affect and negative affect), 
comprised of 10 items each can then be calculated from it. 
 Mindfulness: 
Toronto Mindfulness Scale (TMS). The TMS is a 13-item self-report measure of 
mindfulness with two factors: curious and decentering. The curious factor reflects an open 
acceptance and desire to learn about present experiences, and the decentering factor reflects a 
movement away from one’s inner-thoughts to a broader awareness. This measure has a reliability 
coefficient alpha of .95, demonstrating high internal consistency (Lau et al., 2006).  
 Nostalgia Effects: 
State Functions of Nostalgia Scale (SFNS). This scale is a 16-item self-report measure 
of the various effects of nostalgia (i.e., positive affect, self-regard, social connectedness, and 
meaning in life). Items are measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1= Slightly or not at all, 7 = 
Strongly agree) and begin with the stem: “Thinking about this event…”  (e.g., “Thinking about 
this event makes me feel life is meaningful.”) (Hepper et al., 2012).  Throughout the remainder 
of the methods, results, and discussion sections, the construct the SFNS measures will be 
referred to as the state level of nostalgia since the scale was developed based on analyses of the 
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content of nostalgic memories as a measure of level of nostalgic experience, and the stem of 
scale items, which is specific to thinking about the recalled event/memory. 
Social Connectedness Scale (SCS). This scale is an eight-item self-report measure of 
sense of connectedness, belonging, and affiliation with others. Items are measured on a 6-point 
Likert scale, (1 = strongly agree, 6 = strongly disagree). The reliability coefficient alpha for this 
scale is 0.91 (Lee & Robbins, 1995). 
 Self-Concept Clarity Scale (SCCS). The SCCS is a 12-item self-report measure that 
examines the consistency and clarity of self-concept. Items are measured on a 5-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. The instrument has a reliability 
coefficient alpha of 0.87 (Campbell et al., 1996).  
 New General Self-Efficacy Scale (NGSE). The NGSE is an 8-item self-report measure 
of perceived ability to meet the demands of a given situation. This scale is a shorter measure than 
the General Self-Efficacy Scale. It offers higher reliability (average coefficient alpha across three 
sample = .87) and is a stronger predictor of self-efficacy in specific situations than the longer 
General Self-Efficacy Scale (Chen, Gully, & Eden, 2001). 
 Nostalgia manipulation check. Consistent with past research on nostalgia (e.g. (W.-Y. 
Cheung et al., 2013; Routledge et al., 2011; Sedikides et al., 2014; Wildschut et al., 2006), a 3-
item self-report manipulation check scored on a 6-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = 
strongly agree) will be completed. Items include: “Right now, I am feeling quite nostalgic,” 
“Right now, I am having nostalgic feelings,” “I feel nostalgic at the moment” (coefficient alpha 
= 0.91 to 0.98).  
 Participants were also asked to report how old they were in the memory they recalled. 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
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 The University of Kansas’s IRB approved this study. All participants provided informed 
consent prior to engaging in the study. All questionnaires were de-identified and completed 
online through Qualtrics, which is a secured web-based application that complies with Heath 
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH).  This study was not 
expected to increase risk to participants, and participants were informed that if they became 
uncomfortable and wished to discontinue participation for any reason, they may have done so. 
The item that assessed suicidal thoughts on the MDAS was omitted from the measure to mitigate 
the possibility that querying about suicidal thoughts could elicit suicidal ideation.  
Analysis Methods  
Sample Size and Power. 
 Experiments 1 and 2.  
In order to determine an adequate sample size for this study, a power analysis was 
conducted based on four predictors, a medium estimated effect size (f = 0.25) (Cohen, 1988) and 
a statistical threshold of p < 0.05. A medium effect size was chosen based on reported effect 
sizes in other studies of the effects of nostalgia and autobiographical memory that typically range 
from small to medium (e.g., Baldwin, Biernat, & Landau, 2014; Brown et al., 2012; Sedikides, 
Wildschut, Routledge, & Arndt, 2014; van Tilburg, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2015) and is in line 
with Cooper and Findley’s work (1982), suggesting that a medium effect size can be expected in 
social psychological research. A sample size of 200 participants for each experiment yields a 
power > 0.90. This sample size will also allow a full spectrum of depressive symptomatology to 
be represented, given that prevalence of mood disorders is 20.8% in the general population 




 To determine adequate sample size for this study, an initial power analysis was conducted 
based on two latent variables (state level of nostalgia and depressive symptomology) and eight 
observed variables (MDAS, Δ RRQ, Δ PANAS, TMS, State Functions of Nostalgia Scale, 
SCCS, NGSE, and Social Connectedness Scale scores) with an anticipated medium effect size (f 
= 0.25) and a statistical threshold of p<0.05. A sample size of 100 participants per group yielded 
a power of 0.90.  
Statistical Testing 
Statistical Packages for Social Sciences 22.0 (SPSS) was used to perform descriptive 
statistics, ANOVAs, regression analyses, and Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). EFA was 
conducted using a principal axis factoring extraction method based on eigenvalues greater than 
one with a promax rotation. Structural equation models were estimated in Mplus 6.12 (Muthén & 
Muthén, 1998-2010) using maximum likelihood estimation. To evaluate model fit, the chi-
squared statistic (χ
2
), the competitive fit index (CFI), the root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA), and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) were used 
(Byrne, 2013). Tradition guidelines (e.g. RMSEA < .05 indicating good fit and RMSEA < .09 
indicating adequate fit, SRMR < .08, CFI ≥ .95 indicating good fit and CFI ≥ .90 indicating 
adequate fit) were applied to establish goodness of fit (Brown, 2015; Hu & Bentler, 1999).  
Results 
This project aimed to establish whether varying levels of depressive symptomology 
impact nostalgic recall’s effects on markers of well-being and whether observed effects from 
nostalgic recall can lower state depressive symptomology. It also sought to determine whether 
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degree of mindfulness and engaging in a brief mindfulness intervention added to these effects, 
specifically though lowering depressive symptomology.  
Nostalgia Manipulation Check 
 To assess the efficacy of the nostalgia manipulation, scores on the nostalgia manipulation 
check were compared between recall conditions (nostalgic vs. ordinary).  This check was 
completed using an independent t-tests for Experiments 1 and 2. For experiment 1, results 
revealed a significant effect of recall type t(198) = 10.70, p < .001 with the nostalgic recall 
condition yielding greater feelings of nostalgia (M = 4.16, SD = 0.64) than the ordinary recall 
condition (M = 2.68, SD = 1.22). For experiment 2, results revealed a significant effect of recall 
type t(198) = 7.31, p < .001 with the nostalgic recall condition yielding greater feelings of 
nostalgia (M = 3.90, SD = 0.83) than the ordinary recall condition (M = 2.88, SD = 1.12).  For 
Experiment 3, a 2x2 ANOVA with the between subjects manipulated variables of recall 
condition (nostalgic, ordinary) and mindfulness condition (mindfulness intervention, no 
mindfulness intervention) on the nostalgia manipulation check score was conducted.  A 
significant main effect of recall condition on the nostalgia manipulation check was found, F(1, 
469) = 80.00, p < .001 and with nostalgic recall condition yielding greater feelings of nostalgia 
(higher scores on the nostalgia manipulation check) (M = 3.73, SD = 0.86) than the ordinary 
recall condition (M = 2.97, SD = 1.02).  A main effect of mindfulness condition on the nostalgia 
manipulation check was also found, F(1,469) = 9.12, p = .003 with the mindfulness intervention 
condition yielding greater feelings of nostalgia (higher scores on the nostalgia manipulation 
check) (M = 3.48, SD = 0.93) than the no mindfulness intervention condition (M = 3.22, SD = 
1.09).  There was no significant interaction between mindfulness condition and recall condition 
on the nostalgia manipulation check score in Experiment 3 F(1,469) = 2.08, p = .15. 
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Mindfulness Manipulation Check 
 To assess the efficacy of the mindfulness intervention in Experiment 3, total scores on the 
TMS were compared using a 2x2 ANOVA.   The 2x2 ANOVA was calculated with the between 
subjects manipulated variables of Mindfulness condition (mindfulness intervention, no 
mindfulness intervention) and recall condition (nostalgic, ordinary) on the TMS score.  There 
was no significant main effect of recall condition on TMS F(1,469) = 3.41, p = .066.  However, a 
main effect of mindfulness condition on TMS score was found, F(1,469) = 9.06, p = .003 with 
the mindfulness intervention condition yielding higher ratings of subjective mindfulness (M = 
39.12, SD = 7.81) than the no mindfulness intervention condition (M = 36.94, SD = 8.20).  This 
was qualified by a significant interaction between mindfulness condition and recall condition 
F(1,469) = 7.07, p = .008 (Figure 4).  When participating in the ordinary recall, participants in 
the mindfulness condition reported higher levels of mindfulness (M = 39.41, SD = 7.91) than 
those who were assigned to the no mindfulness intervention group (M = 35.28, SD = 8.50).  
However, when participating in the nostalgic recall condition, scores on mindfulness did not 
differ between the participants who completed the mindfulness intervention (M = 38.82, SD 




Figure 4. Interaction between mindfulness condition and recall condition to predict subjective 
mindfulness scores (TMS scores). 
 
Effects of Nostalgic Recall  
 The findings of this study were consistent with past research, which has shown that 
individuals who recall nostalgia memories as compared to ordinary ones report greater self-
efficacy, feelings of social connectedness, and a more integrated sense of self (for review: 
Sedikides, Wildschut, Routledge, Arndt, et al., 2015). In the present study, ANCOVAs were 
conducted to compare state levels of nostalgia as measured by the SFNS in Experiments 1 and 2, 
controlling for number of years since the memory.  Participants who recalled a nostalgic memory 
not only reported higher levels of nostalgia on the manipulation check than those who recalled an 
ordinary one, but also reported greater effects from this recall, as measured by the SFNS for 
Experiments 1 F(1, 197)) = 5.18, p = .024 (nostalgic recall (M = 80.19, SD = 21.51), ordinary 
recall (M = 66.76, SD = 27.18)) and Experiment 2 F(1, 197) = 7.13, p = .008 (nostalgic recall (M 
= 82.27, SD = 24.35), ordinary recall (M = 71.39, SD = 28.13)) .  The same was true for 
Experiment 3.  These results are consistent with hypothesis 1a2, which predicted a main effect of 
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recall type on SFNS.  To compare state levels of nostalgia as measured by the SFNS in 
Experiment 3, a 2x2 ANCOVA was calculated with the between subjects manipulated variables 
of Mindfulness condition (mindfulness intervention, no mindfulness intervention) and recall 
condition (nostalgic, ordinary) on SFNS scores, controlling for number of years since the 
memory.  This analysis yielded a significant main effect of recall condition F(1,468) = 3.97, p = 
.047 (nostalgic recall (M = 77.11, SD = 21.42), ordinary recall (M = 73.55, SD = 21.82)) (Figure 
5).  Contrary to hypothesis 2a, there was no main effect of mindfulness condition on SFNS score 
F(1,468) = 1.01, p = .315, and the interaction between recall condition and mindfulness 
condition was non-significant F(1,468) = .57, p = .45.  
 
Figure 5. Main effect of recall condition on SFNS scores. 
General Measures of the Constructs Related to Nostalgic Recall’s Effects 
 Several researchers have argued that the effects of engaging in nostalgic recall can be 
captured by improvements in three constructs: self-efficacy, social connectedness, and integrated 
sense of self (e.g., Sedikides et al., 2015, 2008; Stephan et al., 2015; Wildschut et al., 2006). This 
study not only measured how recall type affected feelings of self-efficacy, social connectedness, 
and sense of self within the context recalling the memory (i.e., SFNS) but also how it affected 
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these constructs when the measures were not specifically related to the nostalgic experience (i.e., 
SCS, SCCS, and NGSE). These measures were all highly correlated with one another (p < .001 
with correlation coefficients ranging from .225 to .556). Since these measures were strongly 
related, an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was used to determine the most parsimonious way 
to analyze the data and to avoid issues of multicollinearity. A one factor solution containing the 
four subscales of the SFNS emerged as explaining 44.55% of variance and with strong factor 
loadings (B = .803 to .852). The second factor containing the remaining four scales accounted for 
an additional 19.84% of the variance (Table 3). However, factors loadings for this second factor 
were generally problematic, loading on both extracted component factors with near equal loading 
strength, producing only two items with loadings greater than .4 (a suggested threshold (Costello 
& Osborne, 2005)), and lacking conceptual congruence, which are reasons that render a factor 
solution unacceptable. It may be that this second factor was extracted as a function of EFA’s 
well-known over-identification of component structures (Brown, 2015). Given issues with poor 
factor loadings and a lack of conceptual congruence with the second factor, only the first factor 
containing the four subscales of the SFNS was used in the SEM models; the SCS, SCCS, and 
NGSE were analyzed in regression models.  
Table 3 
Summary of EFA for Measures Related to Psychological Well-being 
Measure Factor 1 Loadings (B) Factor 2 Loadings (B) 
SFNS Self-regulation .852 .198 
SFNS Life Meaning .831 .147 
SFNS Positive Affect .810 .208 
SFNS Social Connectedness .803 .243 
Self-efficacy Scale .362 -.340 
Self-concept Clarity Scale .392 -.641 
SCS Social Connectedness -.480 .541 
SCS Assurance -.066 .295 
% of total variance explained 44.55 19.84 
Note: SFNS = State Function of Nostalgia Scale, SCS = Social Connectedness Scale, B = factor 
loadings.  
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Measures of depressive symptomology 
 This study incorporated several measures of state and trait depressive symptomology. An 
EFA, using the same parameters as above, was used to determine the best way to characterize 
these measures. The EFA resulted in a two-factor solution. The first factor contained the 
rumination subscale of the RRQ, the four subscales of the MDAS, and the negative affect 
subscale of the PANAS with strong factor loadings (B = .586 to .917) and explained 53.42% of 
the total variance. This factor is conceptually sound and captures several important domains of 
depressive symptomology. The two measures that did not load highly onto this factor were the 
positive scale of the PANAS and the reflection subscale of the RRQ, loading instead on a second 
factor. The second factor explained an additional 13.86% of the total variance with only the 
PANAS positive affect subscale producing a loading greater than .4, which is suggested as a 
threshold (Costello & Osborne, 2005). Positive affect is associated with positive coping skills 
and would not be expected to be consistent with depressive symptomology in the same way as 
negative affect (Watson, 1988; Wichers, Jacobs, Dermon, Thiery, & van Os, 2007). Therefore, 
for analyses of depressive symptomology, this study used the six items that loaded onto the first 
factor (RRQ Rumination, MDAS Emotion, MDAS Cognition, MDAS Somatic, MDAS 
Interpersonal, PANAS Negative Affect) to define depressive symptomology. 
Combining of Experiments 1 and 2 
Given that Experiments 1 and 2 used identical methodology and that numerous studies 
have shown that university student and MTurk samples produce indistinguishable results (e.g., 
Casler et al., 2013), a one-way ANOVA looking at the MDAS total score, the nostalgia 
manipulation check, and the SFNS total score between Experiments 1 and 2 was conducted.  
This ANOVA evaluated whether there were differences between experiments in terms of 
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depressive symptomology, feelings of nostalgia, or state levels of nostalgia, as measured by the 
SFNS, which has been shown to increase after engaging in nostalgic recall. As expected, there 
was no effect of experiment for any of these measures (nostalgia manipulation check F(1, 398) = 
.052, p = .82; SFNS total score F(1, 398) = 1.72, p = .19; MDAS total score F(1, 398) = .12, p = 
.73).  Furthermore, separate EFAs for the depressive symptomology measures and for the 
constructs measured in the SFNS for Experiments 1 and 2 yielded nearly identical component 
loadings (e.g. differences between Experiment 1 and 2 factor loadings for the components of the 
SFNS ranged in magnitude from .024 to .044 and differences between Experiment 1 and 2 factor 
loadings for the depressive symptomology measures ranged in magnitude from .005 to .084). As 
a result, the data from Experiments 1and 2 were combine and treated as a single data set for all 
subsequent analyses, which created a larger sample size, increased power and improved external 
validity through increasing demographic variability. Table 4 provides a summary of descriptive 
statistics for the experiments and experimental conditions. 
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics across Experiments and Experimental Conditions 
 Experiments 1 & 2 Experiment 3 
Condition 
 








 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Measure       
Nostalgia       
SFNS (Total) 81.2 (22.9) 69.1 (27.7) 75.5 (23.6) 73.4 (22.6) 78.6 (19.1) 21.2 (21.2) 
    Positive Affect 19.7 (6.6) 17.7 (7.3) 18.1 (7.0) 18.5 (6.2) 19.5 (6.2) 18.8 (5.5) 
    Self-regard 19.7 (6.3) 17.3 (7.0) 17.7 (6.9) 18.2 (6.4) 18.1 (5.6) 17.9 (5.9) 
    Social Connect. 19.7 (7.1) 16.2 (7.8) 18.9 (6.3) 16.7 (6.9) 19.3 (5.9) 16.9 (6.3) 
    Life Meaning 21.8 (6.3) 18.0 (7.9) 20.8 (6.5) 20.0 (6.1) 21.7 (5.2) 20.2 (6.4) 
Nostalgia Check 4.0 (.74) 2.8 (1.2) 3.7 (.94) 2.8 (1.0) 3.8 (.79) 3.2 (.96) 
Baseline Depressive Symptoms      
MDAS (Total) 101.7 (36.0) 100.1 (33.6) 105.7 (33.0) 101.3 (26.4) 101.7 (31.5) 100. 0 (28.6) 
    Emotion 29.0 (9.5) 28.3 (9.2) 30.0 (8.3) 29.0 (7.2) 29.5 (8.3) 28.7 (7.4) 
    Cognitive 23.1 (9.5) 23.0 (9.5) 24.6 (9.5) 23.0 (7.6) 22.8 (8.2) 22.2 (7.7) 
    Somatic 25.1 (9.2) 24.9 (8.2) 26.4 (8.4) 25.3 (6.8) 25.8 (8.2) 25.8 (7.9) 
    Interpersonal 24.5 (10.5) 23.9 (9.5) 24.8 (9.8)) 24.0 (8.5) 23.6 (9.8) 23.3 (8.6) 
PANAS Neg. Affect 16.4 (7.6) 15.3 (6.3) 41.5 (7.7) 40.4 (7.8) 39.8 (8.9) 40.2 (7.8) 




10.4 (11.5) 1.8 (4.6) 3.8 (4.1) .96 (2.3) 5.3 (5.1) 1.5 (2.8) 
Mindfulness       
TMS (Total) N/A N/A 17.5 (4.5) 16.2 (4.9) 18.0 (4.7) 18.4 (4.7) 
    Curiosity N/A N/A 38.6 (7.6) 35.3 (8.5) 38.8 (7.7) 39.4 (7.9) 
    Decentering N/A N/A 21.1 (4.0) 19.1 (4.6) 20.8 (4.3) 21.0 (4.3) 
Time 2 Depressive Symptoms      
PANAS Neg. Affect N/A N/A 16.4 (6.2) 14.9 (5.2) 15.8 (6.7) 14.2 (4.8) 
RRQ Rumination        N/A N/A 39.4 (8.8) 38.3 (8.8) 37.8 (9.4) 39.1 (8.5) 
Note: Social Connect. = Social Connectedness, PANAS Neg. Affect = PANAS Negative Affect, 
Nost. = Nostalgic Recall, Ord. = Ordinary Recall, Mind. = Mindfulness Exercise 
 
Evaluation of Constructs Related to SFNS 
 Constructs of self-efficacy, social connectedness, and self-concept are measured on the 
SFNS.  This study assessed whether independent measures of these constructs were also related 
to nostalgia.  The SFNS’s domains assess these constructs, but within the context of a memory 
recall (e.g., “Thinking about this event makes me feel life is meaningful”).  What is unknown, is 
whether these constructs, when assessed outside the context of a memory (e.g., “In general, I 
have a clear sense of who I am and what I am.”), are influenced by nostalgic recall and 
depressive symptomology in the same way. 
 To evaluate this two regression models for each of the constructs were run for 
Experiments 1 and 2 and two for Experiment 3. Models with SCS, SCCS, and NGSE as the 
dependent variables were run and results are summarized in Table 5.  To control for age 
difference between the time of the memory and current age, the first model contained the age 
difference. The second model contained age difference, recall condition, baseline level 
depressive symptomology, and the interaction between recall condition and baseline level 
depressive symptomology.  Results were consistent across all three constructs and across 
Experiments 1 and 2 and Experiment 3, results for these three scales differed from those obtained 
for the SFNS.  Baseline level of depressive symptomology but not recall condition predicted 
self-efficacy, social connectedness, and self-concept clarity.   
 58 
Table 5 
Summary of Regression Results for SCS, SCCS, and NGSE 
Experiments 1 and 2 
Regression components F/t (df) R(R
2
Δ) SE 
Self-Efficacy Scale    
     Model 1 .789 (1,398) .044(.002) 4.72 
        # of years since memory -.89  .028 
     Model 2 38.01*** (4,395) .527(.276)*** 4.72 
        Age Diff -1.52  .027 
        Recall Condition .841  .527 
        Depressive Symptomology  -4.03***  .119 
        Recall Condition * Depressive Sx .22  .074 
Social Connectedness    
     Model 1 1.75 (1,398) .066(.004) 12.96 
        # of years since memory -1.32  0.067 
  Model 2 64.32*** (4,395) .628(.390)*** 10.15 
        # of years since memory -2.06*  .058 
        Recall Condition 1.83  1.13 
        Depressive Symptomology  4.71***  .257 
        Recall Condition * Depressive Sx .19  .160 
Self-Concept Clarity     
     Model 1 6.09* (1,398) .123(.015) 10.06 
        # of years since memory 2.47*  0.067 
  Model 2 70.20*** (4,395) .645(.40)*** 7.78 
        # of years since memory 3.08*  .045 
        Recall Condition -1.16  .87 
        Depressive Symptomology  -5.69***  .12 
        Recall Condition * Depressive Sx .642  .12 
Experiment 3 
Self-Efficacy Scale    
     Model 1 3.71 (1,471) .088(.008) 4.33 
        # of years since memory -1.93  .048 
  Model 2 22.90*** (4,468) .405(.156)*** 3.99 
        # of years since memory -.455  .049 
        Recall Condition -1.19  .40 
        Depressive Symptomology -3.24***  .13 
        Recall Condition * Depressive Sx .504  .081 
Social Connectedness    
     Model 1 2.49 (1,471) .073(.005) 12.80 
        # of years since memory 1.58  .142 
  Model 2 61.88 (4,468) .588(.341)*** 10.41 
        # of years since memory -.284  .13 
        Recall Condition .964  1.05 
        Depressive Symptomology 4.24***  .35 
        Recall Condition * Depressive Sx .432  .21 
Self-Concept Clarity     
 59 
     Model 1 .958 (1,471) .002(.002)  
        # of years since memory -.98  .091 
  Model 2 64.36*** (4,468) .355 (.353)***  
        # of years since memory .089  .080 
        Recall Condition 1.25  .660 
        Depressive Symptomology -5.24***  .221 
        Recall Condition * Depressive Sx .495  .133 
Note: Sx=symptomology *=p<.050, **=p≤.01, ***=p≤.001 
 
Analyses of Hypotheses: 
For the analyses of the hypotheses, both Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) and 
regression were used.  SEM, which is based upon a regression framework, allows for the 
simultaneous estimation of all relationships in each model and can account for variables that 
influence the predictors, giving a more accurate representation of real life scenarios.  However, 
SEM is limited in its ability to test for interaction effects, which regression is capable of doing.  
Using both methods allowed for the evaluation of the hypotheses of this study and capitalized of 
the strengths of each analysis methodology.  Thus, the remainder of the results section is broken 
into two parts: SEM analyses and regression analyses, with the regression section addressing 
interactions.  
Aim 1: Evaluating the effect of level of depressive symptomology on state level of 
nostalgia as measured by SFNS. 
Structural equation modeling results: 
 Experiments 1 and 2: 
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Figure 6. Effects of depressive symptomology on nostalgic benefit, accounting for recall 
condition. B(SE) ***p < .001, two-tailed.  
To assess the impact of depressive symptomology on the state level of nostalgia as 
measured by the SFNS, a SEM was used. The model defined two latent variables: 1) level of 
depressive symptomology at baseline as defined by the observed variables of the rumination 
subscale of the RRQ, the four subscales of the MDAS, and the negative affect subscale of the 
PANAS and 2) State level of nostalgia after memory recall as defined by the observed variables 
of four subscales of the SFNS. The model also accounted for recall type (using dummy coding 
with ordinary recall = 0 and nostalgic recall = 1) by adding it as a predictor of the state level of 
nostalgia (Figure 6). This model yielded a good fit with χ
2
(43) = 147.07, p < .001, RMSEA = 
.078; SRMR = 0.035; CFI = .97.  Higher levels of depressive symptoms negatively predicted 
state level of nostalgia B = -.33, SE = 0.046, p < .001, consistent with hypothesis 1a1. 
Additionally, recalling a nostalgic memory predicted higher levels state levels of nostalgia than 
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recalling an ordinary memory B = .25, SE = 0.05, p < .001.  These findings support hypothesis 
1a2.  
 Experiment 3: 
 Experiment 3 also assesses the effect of depressive symptomology on the state level of 
nostalgia as measured by the SFNS and partially replicated findings from Experiments 1 and 2. 
The model defined two latent variables: 1) level of depressive symptomology at baseline as 
defined by the observed variables of the rumination subscale of the RRQ, the four subscales of 
the MDAS, and the negative affect subscale of the PANAS and 2) state level of nostalgia after 
memory recall as defined by the observed variables of four subscales of the SFNS. The model 
also accounted for recall condition (using dummy coding with ordinary recall = 0 and nostalgic 
recall = 1) by adding it as a predictor of the state level of nostalgia (Figure 7). This model 
yielded a good fit with χ
2
(43) = 149.87, p < .001, RMSEA = .072; SRMR = 0.041; CFI = .96. 
Higher levels of depressive symptomology predicted lower state levels of nostalgia B = -.32, SE 
= 0.046, p < .001, which further supports hypothesis 1a1. However, type of memory recalled 
(nostalgic vs. ordinary) did not significantly predict state level of nostalgia in Experiment 3 B = 
.078, SE = 0.047, p = .093, which is inconsistent with hypothesis 1a2.    
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Figure 7. Model illustrating relationship between level of depressive symptomology and benefits 
of nostalgic recall, accounting for recall condition. B(SE) ns = not significant; ***p < .001, two-
tailed. 
Regression results: 
 Experiments 1 and 2: 
To assess the impact of depressive symptomology, recall condition, and the interaction 
between depressive symptomology and recall condition on the state level of nostalgia as 
measured by the SFNS, regression was used.  To control for age difference between current age 
and age in the memory, a model with age difference predicting SFNS was compared to a model 
containing age difference, recall condition, baseline level of depressive symptomology, and the 
interaction between recall type and baseline depressive symptomology.  The model with age 
difference was significant F(1, 398) = 8.53, p = .004 and age difference predicted SFNS score 
t(399) = 2.92, p < .004, suggesting that older memories are associated with higher state levels of 
nostalgia.  This makes sense as nostalgic memories tend to be older memories than ordinary ones 
and nostalgic memories are hypothesized to increase state levels of nostalgia.  To directly test for 
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effects of recall condition along with depressive symptomology and the interaction of the two 
while controlling for age difference, a second model was run.  Recall condition, depressive 
symptomology, and their interaction accounted for a significance portion of variance the 
variance after controlling for age difference ΔR
2
 = .160, p <.001.  This model yielded significant 
main effects of baseline level of depressive symptomology t(399) = -2.75, p = .006 (lower levels 
of depression predicted higher state levels of nostalgia) and recall condition t(399) = 4.84, p < 
.001 (nostalgic recall condition predicted higher state levels of nostalgia than the ordinary recall 
condition did), which supports hypotheses 1a1 and 1a2 respectively.  However, the interaction 
term between recall condition and baseline level of depressive symptomology was not 
significant, failing to support hypothesis 1b (see Table 6 for summary of results).  
Table 6 
Summary of Regression Results for SFNS for Experiments 1 and 2 
Regression Model for state level of nostalgia for Experiments 1 and 2 
Regression components F/t (df) R(R
2
Δ) SE 
State level of nostalgia    
     Model 1 8.53*** (1, 398) .145(.021)** 5.81 
        # of years since memory 2.92***  .030 
     Model 2 21.79*** (4, 395) .425(.16)*** 5.34 
        # of years since memory .565  .031 
        Recall Condition 4.84***  .596 
        Depressive Symptomology -2.75**  .135 
        Recall Condition * Depressive Sx .438  .084 
Note: Sx=symptomology *=p<.050, **=p≤.01, ***=p≤.001 
 
Experiment 3: 
The same regression analysis as described above for Experiments 1 and 2 was conducted 
for Experiment 3 to evaluate the relationship between recall type, depressive symptomology, and 
their interaction on predicting SFNS while controlling for age difference in the memories.  The 
model with age difference was not significant F(1, 471) = .069, p = ns.  This model was 
significant in Experiments 1 and 2 but not for Experiment 3.  Experiments 1 and 2, which were 
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drawn from MTURK and undergraduate psychology students, had a wider age range of 
participants (Min age = 18, Max age = 72, mean age = 27.2) than did Experiment 3, which was 
drawn exclusively from undergraduate psychology students (Min age = 18, Max age = 30, mean 
age = 18.86).  This difference in age range likely accounts for this difference between 
Experiments 1 and 2 and Experiment 3.  
The second model tested for effects of recall condition along with depressive 
symptomology and the interaction of the two while controlling for age difference.  Recall 
condition, depressive symptomology, and their interaction accounted for a significance portion 
of variance the variance after controlling for age difference ΔR
2
 = .122, p < .001.  This model 
yielded a significant main effect of baseline level of depressive symptomology t(472) = -3.05 p = 
.002 (lower levels of depression predicted higher state levels of nostalgia), which supports again 
hypothesis 1a1.  Recall condition trended towards significance but was not significant t(472) = 
1.86, p = .063, which failed to support hypothesis 1a2 in Experiment 3.  The interaction term 
between recall condition and baseline level of depressive symptomology was not significant, 
failing to support hypothesis 1b. (see Table 7 for summary of results).  
Table 7 
Summary of Regression Results for SFNS for Experiment 3 
Regression Model for state level of nostalgia for Experiment 3 
Regression components F/t (df) R(R
2
Δ) SE 
State level of nostalgia    
     Model 1 .069 (1, 471) .012(.0) 4.93 
        # of years since memory -.26  .055 
     Model 2 16.31*** (4, 468) .350(.121)*** 4.63 
        # of years since memory -.18  .057 
        Recall Condition 1.86  .47 
        Depressive Symptomology -3.05**  .16 
        Recall Condition * Depressive Sx .74  .094 
Note: Sx=symptomology *=p<.050, **=p≤.01, ***=p≤.001 
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Aim 2: Evaluate the mindfulness intervention’s ability to heighten reported 
nostalgia (i.e., scores on the SFNS) across varying degrees of depressive 
symptomatology. 
Structural equation modeling results: 
 Experiment 3: 
 It was hypothesized that higher levels mindfulness would predict greater levels of state 
nostalgia. Past research has demonstrated that higher levels of depressive symptomology predict 
lower levels of mindfulness (e.g., Jimenez, Niles, & Park, 2010). The model in Figure 8 
examined these relationships with three latent variables: 1) level of depressive symptomology at 
baseline, 2) mindfulness, as defined by the two subscales of the TMS, and 3) state level of 
nostalgia, as measured by the SFNS. This model achieved good fit with χ
2
(51) = 147.41, p <. 
001, RMSEA = .063; SRMR = 0.037; CFI = .97. Higher levels of mindfulness yielded greater 
state levels of nostalgia B = .32, SE = 0.052, p < .001, supporting hypothesis 2a. Higher levels of 
baseline depressive symptomology predicted higher levels of mindfulness, as measured by the 
TMS, B = .11, SE = 0.056, p = .042. The results from Experiment 3 also replicated findings from 
Experiments 1 and 2. These results supported hypothesis 1a1, demonstrating that higher levels of 




Figure 8. Model demonstrating the relationship between baseline depressive symptomology, 
mindfulness, and state level of nostalgia. B(SE); *p < .05; ***p < .001, two-tailed. 
An additional model incorporated the effects of the two experimental manipulations: 
mindfulness (using dummy coding with no mindfulness intervention = 0 and mindfulness 
intervention = 1) and recall condition (using dummy coding with ordinary recall = 0 and 
nostalgic recall = 1) on report of subjective mindfulness and state level of nostalgia, respectively. 
This model (Figure 9) achieved good fit with χ
2
(74) = 202.97, p <. 001, RMSEA = .061; SRMR 
= 0.041; CFI = .96. Individuals who reported lower levels of depressive symptomology reported 
higher levels of state nostalgia than individuals who reported higher levels of depressive 
symptomology, regardless of which type of memory they recalled B = -.35, SE = 0.045, p < .001, 
supporting hypothesis 1a. Although this model did not test whether the mindfulness 
manipulation lead to greater state levels of nostalgia, higher levels of reported subjective 
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mindfulness yielded greater state levels of nostalgia B = .31, SE = 0.053, p < .001, partially 
supporting hypothesis 3a in this basic model. Individuals who participated in the brief 
mindfulness intervention reported higher levels of subjective mindfulness than individuals who 
were assigned to the no mindfulness intervention condition B = .17, SE = 0.052, p = .001.  The 
effects of the mindfulness manipulation on state levels of nostalgia were tested for and are 
reported in the regression section. According to this model, assignment to the nostalgic recall 
condition did not predict significant differences from the ordinary recall condition in state levels 
of nostalgia B = .062, SE = 0.045, p = .17.  
Figure 9. Model illustrating the relationship between baseline depressive symptomology, 
mindfulness, and nostalgic benefit, accounting for memory recall and mindfulness 
manipulations. B(SE); ns = not significant, *p < .05; ***p < .001, two-tailed. 
Given that recall condition did not predict SFNS in Figure 9, an additional model was 
created to explore individuals’ subjective ratings of nostalgia, as measured by the nostalgia 
manipulation check and how this variable related to mindfulness condition, TMS score, recall 
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condition, and SFNS.  This model achieved good fit with χ
2
(105) = 3474.3, p <. 001, RMSEA = 
.059; SRMR = 0.045; CFI = .96.  Although the type of memory participants recalled (ordinary 
vs. nostalgic) did not predict state level of nostalgia in the previous model, participants’ report of 
subjective experience of nostalgia, as measured by the nostalgia manipulation check, after 
memory recall was related to state levels of nostalgia r = .20, SE = 0.048, p < .001 and to 
subjective levels of mindfulness r = .32, SE = 0.050, p < .001. Furthermore, both engaging in the 
brief mindfulness intervention B = .13, SE = 0.041, p < .001 and engaging in nostalgic recall B = 
.36, SE = 0.039, p < .001 predicted higher feelings of nostalgia, as measured by the nostalgia 
manipulation check (Figure10).  
 
Figure 10. Model examining the relationship between baseline depressive symptomology, 
mindfulness, and state level of nostalgia, accounting for subjective rating experienced nostalgia, 
recall condition, and mindfulness condition. Nostalgia Manip. Check = nostalgia manipulation 
check. B(SE); *p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001, two-tailed.  
Regression results:         
 The SEM models above are unable to evaluate interactions between continuous and 
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discrete variables (i.e., mindfulness condition, recall condition, and baseline depressive 
symptomology).  To assess the hypothesized interactions on state level of nostalgia as measured 
by the SFNS, regression was used.  To control for age difference between current age and age in 
the memory, a model with age difference predicting SFNS was compared to a model containing 
age difference, mindfulness condition, recall condition, baseline level of depressive 
symptomology, the interaction between mindfulness condition and baseline depressive 
symptomology, and the interaction between mindfulness condition, recall condition, and baseline 
level of depressive symptomology.  The model containing age difference was not significant, but 
the second model explained a significant proportion of additional variance ΔR
2
 = .126, p < .001 
and was significant F(6, 466) = 11.20, p <.001.  There was no main effect of mindfulness 
condition in predicting SFNS, failing to support hypothesis 2a.  The 2-way interaction between 
mindfulness condition and baseline depressive symptomology and the 3-way interaction between 
mindfulness condition, recall condition, and baseline level of depressive symptomology were 
also non-significant, failing to support hypotheses 2b1 and 2b2 respectively.  There was, 
however, a main effect of baseline level of depressive symptomology t(472) = -2.18, p = .030, 
such that higher levels of depressive symptomology predict lower state levels of nostalgia across 











Summary of Regression Results for SFNS for Experiment 3 Incorporating Mindfulness Condition 
Regression Model for state level of nostalgia for Experiment 3 
Regression components F/t (df) R(R
2
Δ) SE 
State level of nostalgia    
     Model 1 .069 (1, 471) .0(.0) 4.93 
        # of years since memory -.26  .055 
     Model 2 11.20*** (6, 466) .126(.126)*** 4.63 
        # of years since memory -.24  .057 
        Mindfulness Condition .66  .43 
        Recall Condition 1.92  .47 
        Baseline Depressive Symptomology -2.18*  .33 
        Mindfulness Condition * Baseline Depressive  
        Symptomology 
.59  .099 
        Mindfulness Condition * Recall Cond *  
       Baseline Depressive Symptomology 
1.01  .026 
Model 3 11.62 (10, 462) .536(.161)*** 4.20 
        # of years since memory -.62  .052 
        Baseline Depressive Symptomology -2.97*  .30 
        Recall Condition .19  .45 
        Mindfulness Condition -1.39  .40 
        Mindfulness Condition * Baseline Depressive    
        Symptomology 
1.17  .091 
        Mindfulness Condition * Baseline Depressive  
        Symptomology * Recall Condition 
.90  .024 
        Subjective Mindfulness (TMS) 7.78***  .063 
        Nostalgia Manipulation check 4.09***  .22 
        Subjective Mindfulness * Baseline  
        Depressive Symptomology 
.94  .035 
        Subjective Mindfulness * Baseline  
        Depressive Symptomology * Nostalgia     
       Manipulation Check 
-1.11  .010 
Note: *=p<.050, **=p≤.01, ***=p≤.001 
 
 A regression model was added to mirror the SEM in Figure 10 and examine individuals’ 
subjective ratings of nostalgia, as measured by the nostalgia manipulation check and how this 
variable related to mindfulness condition, TMS score, recall condition, and SFNS.  To do so, a 
third model was added the model in Table 8 that incorporated subjective level of mindfulness 
(TMS score), subjective ratings of nostalgia (as measured by the nostalgia manipulation check), 
the interaction between subjective mindfulness level and baseline depressive symptomology, and 
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the interaction between subjective mindfulness, subjective ratings of nostalgia, and baseline 
levels of depressive symptomology.  This third model explained a significant proportion of 
additional variance ΔR
2
 = .161, p < .001 and was significant F(10, 462) = 18.62, p <.001.  There 
were main effects of subjective level of mindfulness t(472) = 7.78, p < .001 and of the nostalgia 
manipulation check t(472) = 4.09, p < .001 in predicting SFNS.  Higher subjective levels of 
mindfulness predicted higher SFNS scores, and higher nostalgia manipulation check scores also 
predicted higher SFNS scores.  The interactions were non-significant. 
Aim 3: Determine whether nostalgia (as defined by both engaging in nostalgic recall 
and by reported state level of nostalgia) can decrease depressive symptomology and 
whether the mindfulness intervention can have an additive effect. 
Structural equation modeling results: 
 Experiment 3: 
A SEM model was created to evaluate the relationship between mindfulness condition, 
recall condition, SFNS, and subjective levels of mindfulness (TMS) on changes in state levels of 
depressive symptomology.  This model achieved a fit of χ
2
(97) = 315.85, p <. 001, RMSEA = 
.069; SRMR = 0.048; CFI = .93 (Figure 11).  SFNS predicted reductions in state levels of 
depression B = .42, SE = .14, p = .002, supporting hypothesis 3a1. Recall condition and 
mindfulness condition did not significantly predict change in state depressive symptomology B = 
.044, SE = .12, p = .70; B = -.11, SE = .11, p = .32, respectively. This suggests that these 
conditions were not effective at decreasing depressive symptomology. Given that neither the 
mindfulness condition nor mindfulness score on the TMS predicted change in state levels of 
depressive symptomology, hypothesis 3a3 was not supported. Recall condition as a predictor of 
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nostalgic benefit was also non-significant in this model B = .062, SE = .045, p = .17, suggesting 
that recall type was not an effective predictor of nostalgic benefit in this model.  
Given that lower baseline depressive symptomology predicted higher state levels of 
nostalgia and that greater state levels of nostalgia predicted greater changes in state depressive 
symptomology, a model was run to test whether baseline depressive symptomology co-varied 
with depression change score. The model yielded similar fit statistics as the model in Figure 11 
χ
2
(71) = 255.90, p <. 001, RMSEA = .074; SRMR = 0.048; CFI = .94 and showed a lack of 
relationship between baseline depression and change in depression symptomology after 
experimental intervention r = -.069, SE = 0.134, p = .609. This suggests that the changes in state 
depressive symptomology are not due to regression to the mean, but, instead, may be due to 
being able to engage with and feel positive after recalling a memory.  Furthermore, the 
interaction between baseline depressive symptomology and SFNS was tested in the regression 
results section below (See Table 9) and was non-significant. Since nostalgic benefit predicted 
change in depressive symptoms and there is no interaction between baseline depressive 
symptoms and state level of nostalgia, changes in depressive symptoms have more to do with 
ability to access positive well-being benefits after a memory recall than mood at baseline or how 
baseline mood impacts state levels of nostalgia. 
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Figure 11. Model examining relationships between baseline depressive symptomology, 
mindfulness, nostalgic benefit, and change in depressive symptomology after mindfulness and 
memory recall manipulations, accounting for mindfulness and recall conditions. B(SE); ns = not 
significant; *p < .05; ** p < .01; ***p < .001, two-tailed.  
 
Regression results: 
 Experiment 3: 
 To more fully evaluate aim 3 and identify factors leading to reduction in depressive 
symptomology, regression models were created.  One model with age difference between the 
time of the memory and current age was created to control for this factor.  The overall model was 
not significant F(1, 471) = .27, p = .60.  The second model, added baseline depressive 
symptomology, recall condition, mindfulness condition, SFNS, two-way interaction between 
recall condition and SFNS, two-way interaction between recall condition and baseline depressive 
symptomology, two-way interaction between baseline depressive symptomology and SFNS, 
three-way interaction between mindfulness condition, recall condition, and baseline depressive 
symptomology, and three-way interaction between mindfulness condition, SFNS, and baseline 
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depressive symptomology.  This model accounted for a significant portion of variance after 
controlling for age difference at the time of the memory recalled ΔR
2
 = .527, p <.001.  Results 
are summarized in Table 9.  This model provided support for hypothesis 3a1, which predicted 
that higher state levels of nostalgia would lead to greater reduction in depressive symptomology 
t(472) = 5.78, p <.001.  It also supported hypotheses 3a2, which predicted that participating in 
the nostalgic recall condition would lead to greater decreases in depressive symptomology t(472) 
= 2.20, p =.028.  There was a significant relationship between mindfulness condition and 
changes in depressive symptomology, which hypothesis 3a3 predicted, however, the direction of 
the effect is opposite of what was predicted t(472) = -6.87, p <.001.  This suggests that 
individuals who did not participate in the mindfulness intervention has a greater decrease in 
depressive symptomology than did individuals who participated in the intervention.  Evidence to 
support the two- and three-way interactions (hypotheses 3b1-3b5) was not found. 
Table 9 
Summary of Regression Results for Change in Depressive Symptomology in Experiment 3  
Regression Model for changes in level of depressive symptomology for Experiment 3 
Regression components F/t (df) R(R
2
Δ) SE 
Change in Depressive Symptomology    
     Model 1 .27 (1, 471) .024(.001) 4.93 
        # of years since memory -.52   
     Model 2 51.62*** (10, 462) .726(.527)*** 4.63 
        # of years since memory -.29  .006 
        Baseline Depressive Symptomology -.58  .018 
        Recall Condition 2.20*  .050 
        Mindfulness Condition  -6.87***  .048 
        SFNS 5.78***  .016 
        Recall Condition * SFNS .32  .010 
        Recall Condition * Baseline Depressive  
        Symptomology 
-.45  .024 
        Baseline Depressive Symptomology * SFNS -.64  .007 
        Baseline Depressive Symptomology *  
        Mindfulness Condition * Recall Condition 
.47  .006 
        Baseline Depressive Symptomology *  





Note: *=p<.050, **=p≤.01, ***=p≤.001 
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Discussion 
Experiments 1 and 2 
Consistent with past research (e.g., Routledge, Wildschut, Sedikides, & Juhl, 2013; 
Wildschut et al., 2006), Experiments 1 and 2 of the present study found that recalling nostalgic 
events produced higher state levels of nostalgia (i.e., increased meaning in life, social 
connectedness, positive affect, and self-regard) than recalling a memories of ordinary, everyday 
events, which supported hypothesis 1a2. This finding, in addition to the manipulation check, 
demonstrated that the recall manipulation was successful in producing an experience consistent 
with nostalgia in this study.  The present study advances previous work by demonstrating that 
there are conditions, such as depressive mood state, that can limit people’s ability to benefit from 
recalling autobiographical memories.    
Of note, individuals who recalled nostalgic memories ranked themselves higher in the 
domains of meaning in life, social connectedness, positive affect, and self-regard than those who 
recalled ordinary memories. The higher scores in these domains reported by the nostalgic recall 
group were only seen in measures that specifically referred back to the process of thinking about 
the memory; group differences were indistinguishable when the same constructs measured by 
these domains were assessed outside of the context of the memory (i.e., nostalgic recall group 
reported higher scores on the SFNS than did the ordinary recall group, but both groups scored 
similarly on the SCS, SCCS, and NGSE).  Similar results were observed in Experiment 3, 
lending a common interpretation across all three experiments.  One interpretation of these 
findings is that nostalgic memories are helpful in bolstering these domains when reflecting on a 
particular nostalgic moment, but these effects may not generalize beyond that reflection.  If this 
explanation were to be true and nostalgic recall were to be used as a therapeutic intervention, it 
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would be critical for therapists to help clients identify strategies for generalizing aspects of their 
memories that engender these feelings of connectedness, self-efficacy, and meaning.  The ability 
to generalize these feelings would help clients recognize positive aspects of current and future 
situations and cultivate positive feelings across time and settings.  Given differences were found 
between the nostalgic recall group and the ordinary recall group on the SFNS but not on the 
SCCS, SCS, or the NGSE, then the SFNS may be a more sensitive measure of changes due to 
nostalgic recall.     
Participants who reported greater negative affect, rumination, and symptoms associated 
with depression also reported lower state levels of nostalgia across both recall conditions.  Thus, 
Experiments 1 and 2 provided support for hypothesis 1a1, which predicted a main effect of 
depressive symptomology, such that higher levels of depressive symptomology would lead to 
lower state levels of nostalgia, as measured by the SFNS. However, this effect was not specific 
to nostalgic memories, and therefore hypothesis 1b predicting an interaction between recall 
condition and depressive symptomology was not supported.  One interpretation of the main 
effect of depressive symptomology is that the constructs measured by the SFNS overlap with the 
constructs measured in depression and/or are tapping the same construct.  While the SFNS and 
depression measures were negatively related (r=-.335, p<.001), they are discrete.  Measures of 
depression thought to be tapping the same construct, such as the Beck Depression Inventory and 
Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression, have been shown to have a stronger relationship, 
correlating between r=.70 and .85 (Brown, Schulberg, & Madonia, 1995).   
These lower state levels of nostalgia associated with social connectedness, positive affect, 
self-regard, and meaning in life across both recall groups that are observed with greater 
depressive symptomology may be due to the cognitive biases in depression.  These results 
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suggest that these biases diminish depressed individual’s ability to see themselves in a positive 
light, regardless of the context.  Overall, higher levels of depressive symptomology are 
associated with lower state levels of nostalgia across both recall groups.  However, when 
comparing equal levels of depressive symptomology, individuals in the nostalgic recall group 
experience higher state levels of nostalgia than do individuals in the ordinary group, across the 
spectrum of depressive symptomology.  This finding is important because it suggests that 
nostalgic recall can boost levels of social connectedness, positive affect, self-regard, and 
meaning of life, even in individuals experiencing more significant depressive symptomology.  
However, engaging in nostalgic recall alone may not be enough to offset the effects of depressive 
symptomology on these domains (i.e., they still score lower on the SFNS than individuals with 
lower baseline levels of depressive symptomology). 
Hypothesis 1b, which predicted an interaction between recall type and level of depressive 
symptomology such that the effects of nostalgic recall would diminish as depressive symptoms 
increased was not supported.  One possible explanation for this lack of interaction could be that 
both nostalgic and ordinary memories are forms of autobiographical recall and as such produce 
similar trends.  Previous research on nostalgic recall and autobiographical recall suggests that 
there is substantial overlap in the effects of recalling both these memories (Bluck et al., 2005; 
Wildschut et al., 2006).  Thus, nostalgic memories may vary from ordinary autobiographical 
memories in the intensity of their effects, rather than the type of effect they produce.  However, 
what this study did not test was if there are difference between autobiographical (i.e., nostalgic 
and ordinary recall groups) and non-autobiographical memories.  Future research comparing 
nostalgic memories to non-autobiographical memories of a similar emotional valance could help 
clarify if this relationship.   
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The lack of interaction between depression and recall type is important from a clinical 
and therapeutic standpoint.  A main effect with no interaction makes engaging in nostalgic 
memory recall a potentially ubiquitous clinical tool.  Interventions aimed at the domains 
associated with nostalgia should produce an increase in domains associated with well-being and 
subsequently decrease depressive state.  The efficacy of nostalgic recall at creating change in 
depressive symptomology will be discussed in the discussion of Experiment 3.    
 Pizzagalli (2014) proposes an integrated model of depression and anhedonia (i.e., loss of 
pleasure) that is consistent with these findings. Pizzagalli argues that anhedonia, a cardinal 
symptom of depression, manifests in part from a combination of cognitive and neurological 
aberrations. Depressed individuals undervalue positive events and less frequently affirm positive 
self attributes in self-referential tasks. They also demonstrate disruptions in dopamine signaling 
and in the mesoliminc dopamine reward pathways. These differences lead to a reduced response 
to positive stimuli, such as positive aspects of nostalgic memories. They also lead to a lack of 
specificity and detail in autobiographical memory recall (e.g., Mark et al., 2007; Raes et al., 
2006; Van Daele et al., 2014) and a tendency for depressed individuals to be self-critical and 
evaluative rather than reflective (e.g., Watkins & Teasdale, 2001) when recalling memories. 
These differences may result in the overall decrease in benefit from memory recall, regardless of 
induction type (nostalgic or ordinary) observed in individuals with higher depressive 
symptomology. It is possible that after recalling a memory (nostalgic or ordinary), the lower 
ratings of state levels of nostalgia observed in individuals with greater depressive symptomology 
are due to being in a low mood state (i.e., higher depressive symptomology is associated with 
lower psychological well-being). However, it is likely that the cognitive and neurological 
disruptions outlined above have an additive effect on this relationship.  Mindfulness is an 
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intervention that has been shown to mitigate some of the effects of depression, and specifically 
decrease rumination while increasing autobiographical memory specificity.   
The present study chose to examine induced nostalgia rather than naturally evoked 
nostalgia, in part to look at nostalgic recall as a potential clinical intervention for depressed 
individuals.  Although this study did not examine naturally evoked nostalgia, it is likely that the 
findings related to the impact of depressive symptomology on ordinary and nostalgic memories 
recall will generalize to naturally evoked autobiographical memories as well.  Thus, these 
findings suggest that individuals in lower mood states may receive the same level of mood boost 
from incidental reminders of positive past events that healthy, non-depressed individuals do on a 
day-to-day basis. However, despite this boost, individuals in lower mood states report lower state 
levels of nostalgia than individuals in more positive mood states.  Thus, lacking the ability to re-
experience positive past events at the same level may make those individuals more vulnerable to 
depression. Finding a way to mitigate the cognitive aberrations associated with depression may 
allow individuals to obtain greater benefits from incidental reminders of past events and help 
them regulate mood. A brief mindfulness intervention was explored as a way to lessen negative 
mood symptoms and increase access to the benefits of nostalgic recall in Experiment 3. 
Experiment 3 
  In Experiment 3, GML was used to test the effects of the experimental 
manipulations of recall type (nostalgic vs. ordinary) and the participation in the mindfulness 
exercise on state levels of nostalgia.  SEM models were used to test theoretical relationships 
between the constructs of mindfulness, state level of nostalgia, and levels of depressive 
symptomology.  As was the case in Experiments 1 and 2, the group who engaged in nostalgic 
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recall reported greater levels of nostalgia on the manipulation check, suggesting that the 
manipulation of memory type was successful at eliciting nostalgia.   
In Experiments 1 and 2, recall type predicted state level of nostalgia.  However, in 
Experiment 3, manipulating recall type only predicted state levels of nostalgia at a marginal level 
of significance.  This perceived decrease in significance between Experiments 1 and 2 and 
Experiment 3 may be due any number of potential factors.  It is unclear what might have led to 
this finding as this manipulation has been widely used and produced robust changes in the 
nostalgia manipulation check of this study.  This finding could imply that the manipulation check 
is more sensitive at measuring nostalgia, especially since the manipulation check asks more 
general questions about experiencing nostalgia whereas the questions on the SFNS are more 
specific to ways in which the memory may or may not have impacted the individual.  This 
difference is important to note as research has demonstrated that people define nostalgia in 
different ways (Hepper, Ritchie, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2012) and their recall may have 
elicited nostalgia but not in all the ways defined by the SFNS.  Nostalgic recall may not affect 
the four domains of the SFNS or effect those domains equally. When examining differences 
between the recall type on the subscales of the SFNS, rather than the latent construct of state 
level of nostalgia, there were significant differences on the Social Connectedness and the 
Meaning in Life subscales for Experiment 3. To explore this finding, future work could examine 
the qualitative summaries participants provided of their memories, such as coding for social 
engagement, to see if the presence of others people in the memory, for example, influences 
response style on the SFNS and/or varies by recall condition.   
An alternative explanation includes random, idiosyncratic responses from a portion of 
participants in Experiment 3. The order of responding to questionnaires may have had an impact.  
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In all experiments, the nostalgia manipulation check immediately followed the memory recall, 
however, the order of the SNFS varied between Experiments 1 and 2 and Experiment 3.  
Following the memory recall in Experiments 1 and 2, participants completed the nostalgia 
manipulation check then the SFNS.  Following the memory recall in Experiment 3, participants 
completed the nostalgia manipulation check, the TMS, and then the SFNS.  Thus answering 
questions about mindfulness prior to completing the SFNS may have also influenced individuals’ 
responses; the mindfulness questionnaire was not a part of Experiments 1 and 2.  Research 
suggests that implicit mindfulness primes can change physiological and psychological responses 
(Bergeron, Almgren-Doré, & Dandeneau, 2016).  Therefore, it is possible that answering 
questions about mindfulness prior to completing the SFNS may have primed participants in 
Experiment 3 to respond more similarly across recall conditions.   
 While baseline level of depressive symptomology predicted state level of nostalgia, 
which is consistent with the results of Experiments 1 and 2, recall condition only marginally 
predicted state level of nostalgia (p=.051).  Mindfulness condition did not predict state level of 
nostalgia.  However, both GLM (Table 8) and SEM (Figure 10) demonstrated that, in 
conjunction with baseline level of depressive symptomology, subjective levels of mindfulness, 
regardless of the experimentally assigned mindfulness condition, and subjective levels of 
nostalgia, as defined by the manipulation check, both predicted state levels of nostalgia.  
Experienced levels of mindfulness and nostalgia demonstrated greater predictive ability than 
corresponding manipulated conditions (assignment to mindfulness intervention and/or to 
nostalgic recall) for SFNS scores.  These results suggest that, while the manipulations did not 
produce the hypothesized results, the theoretical relationship between these variables exists in a 
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way that is consistent with hypothesis 1a2 and 2a (i.e., greater experience of nostalgia and higher 
levels of mindfulness lead to higher state levels of nostalgia).   
While mindfulness condition predicted higher levels of subjective mindfulness, it was a 
small effect (ηp
2
=.019).  Therefore, it is possible that a more robust manipulation (e.g., longer 
and/or repeated mindfulness sessions) will increase the effect of the manipulation, and 
potentially lead to a stronger relationship between mindfulness intervention and state level of 
nostalgia.  This experiment set out to test whether increasing levels of mindfulness predicted 
increases in state levels of nostalgia. A brief mindfulness intervention was used in an attempt to 
augment mindfulness level, but from a theoretical standpoint, the specific mindfulness 
intervention used is less important than its ability to reliably enhance mindfulness and whether or 
not mindfulness level can influence participants’ experienced level of nostalgia.   
Another factor to consider in the interpretation of these results is level of engagement, 
particularly during the nostalgic recall and the mindfulness exercise. The fact that subjective 
level of nostalgia and mindfulness predicted nostalgic benefit, but recall condition and 
mindfulness condition did not might suggest that participants who were more engaged in the 
exercise might have gained more benefit from it.  It may also speak to individual differences in 
natural tendencies and abilities to be nostalgic and/or mindful.  Task engagement and natural 
inclination to be nostalgic and/or mindful may be important factors to consider in future work. 
Using measures to screen for intervention engagement, task motivation, and frequency of 
nostalgic recall and mindfulness practice in future work could be used as a covariate to account 
for task engagement and natural tendencies for these tasks. 
Experiment 3 provided further support for the idea that cognitive style influences the 
ability to experience a nostalgic state after recalling a memory. As previously discussed, 
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although assignment to a mindfulness exercise did not predict greater state levels of nostalgia, 
experiencing higher levels of subjective mindfulness did predict greater state levels of nostalgia. 
Subjective ratings of mindfulness and nostalgia positively correlated with one another (i.e., TMS 
and nostalgia manipulation check), suggesting that these two constructs are related. Although 
varying in temporal dimension (i.e., past memory versus present experience), nostalgia and 
mindfulness are both ways of drawing awareness to one’s self.  Individuals may have different 
abilities and natural tendencies to immerse themselves in tasks requiring self-awareness, even 
when prompted to do so. This finding may also suggest that people’s ability or willingness to 
direct their awareness to a particular task influences their achieved state level of nostalgia.  
Experiment 3 also tested the hypothesis that the mindfulness intervention would mitigate 
the impact of depressive symptomology on the SFNS, whereas, depressive symptomology would 
predict lower SFNS in those who did not participate in the mindfulness intervention (Hypothesis 
2b1).  Experiment 3 did not find evidence to support this hypothesis.  There was a main effect of 
depressive symptomology on SFNS but no interaction between mindfulness intervention and 
depressive symptomology.  This suggests that mindfulness possibly does not affect state levels of 
nostalgia and that the brief, single-shot mindfulness intervention used in this study did not 
change the way that depression impacts SFNS scores.  However, it is unlikely that mindfulness 
has no relationship with state levels of nostalgia, as TMS scores predicted SFNS scores.  It is 
more likely that the mindfulness intervention used in this study did not produce robust enough 
effects to find significance.  Future work using a longer and/or multi-session mindfulness 
intervention could explore this explanation. 
Mindfulness also did not alter the hypothesized relationship between depressive 
symptomology and recall type.  Hypothesis 2b2 predicted that the mindfulness intervention 
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would mitigate the effects of depression on SFNS, leaving a main effect of recall type for the 
mindfulness intervention group and two-way interaction between depressive symptomology and 
recall type (Hypothesis 1b) in the no mindfulness intervention group.  In this study, only 
depressive symptomology achieved statically significance in predicting state level of nostalgia, 
with recall type falling just shy of statistical significance.  This implies that depressive 
symptomology highly impacts the way people report about their experience of memories.  
Research has documented the effect depression has on decreasing memory specificity (e.g., 
Gibbs & Rude, 2004; Raes et al., 2006; Ricarte et al., 2011).  This study adds that as depressive 
symptomology increases, it seems to decrease the positive attributes less depressed individuals 
associate with memory recall.  What was not investigated in the current study was whether 
memory specificity or aspects of the memory recall contribute to this decrease in memory 
recall’s impact or if the decreases in the areas of social connectedness, positive affect, meaning, 
and self-regard observed at higher levels of depressive symptomology are a by-product of 
generally feeling more depressed. 
Aim 3 of this study explored the relationship between mindfulness, recall type, and SFNS 
with respect to changes in depressive mood level. At the beginning of Experiment 3, participants 
completed several measures of trait and state depressive symptomology. Then after engaging in 
the experimental manipulations, participants repeated the measures of depressive symptomology. 
The analysis of change in depressive symptomology focused on state measures of depressive 
symptomology. As was the case in Experiments 1 and 2, baseline level of depressive 
symptomology predicted state level of nostalgia. However, baseline depressive symptomology 
did not predict change in state depressive symptomology after the experimental manipulations, 
meaning that it was possible for all individuals to attain a decrease in negative mood state 
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regardless of their level of symptomology at baseline. This also indicates that initial depressive 
symptomology affects constructs related to positive well-being (i.e., SFNS) and negative mood 
(i.e., change in depressive symptomology) differently.  This finding reinforces the research that 
has posited positive and negative mood are not merely the inverse of one another (Watson & 
Clark, 1997; Wichers, Jacobs, Dermon, Thiery, & van Os, 2007). It is also possible that this 
overall decrease in symptomology across time points could be due to a testing effect. 
Main effects of SFNS, recall condition, and mindfulness condition predicted changes in 
depressive symptomology, supporting hypotheses 3a1-3a3.  Regardless if individuals recalled a 
nostalgic or an ordinary memory, higher state levels of nostalgia predicted decreases in 
depressive symptomology (Hypothesis 3a1).  This suggests that the more a memory activates 
constructs linked to social connectedness, positive affect, meaning, and self-regard (constructs 
comprising the SFNS), the greater its potential to decrease depressive symptomology.   
Recall condition was related to changes in depressive symptomology, such that nostalgic 
recall predicted greater decreases in depressive symptomology than did ordinary recall, which is 
consistent with hypothesis 3b2.  Although there was not an interaction between recall condition 
and SFNS with respect to change in depressive symptomology (Hypothesis 3b1), recall type 
predicted SFNS and both SFNS and recall type predicted changes in depressive symptomology 
suggesting that nostalgia, whether experimentally induced (recall) or whether subjectively 
reported (SFNS score) are related to decreases in depressive symptomology.  These findings 
reinforce the influence of the way people think about the past on depressive symptomology.  Past 
research has demonstrated a link between rumination and critical evaluation of past behaviors to 
be detrimental to mood (e.g., Mor & Winquist, 2002; Rimes & Watkins, 2005), and the current 
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study demonstrated a link between warm, nostalgic reflection on the past to be beneficial to 
mood. 
Previous research has found mindfulness interventions to be an effective way to decrease 
depressive symptomology and increase autobiographical specificity in depressed populations 
(e.g., Barnhofer et al., 2009; Deyo, Wilson, Ong, & Koopman, 2009; Mark, Teasdale, Segal, & 
Soulsby, 2000).  Based on this research, Experiment 3 incorporated a mindfulness intervention 
and assessed its effects on changes in depressive symptomology.  It was hypothesized that the 
mindfulness intervention should lead to greater decreases in depressive symptomology 
(hypothesis 3a3).  There was a main effect of mindfulness intervention on depressive 
symptomology.  However, the effect was in the opposite direction of what was hypothesized.  
Not participating in the mindfulness intervention predicted larger decreases in depressive 
symptomology than participating in the mindfulness intervention.  This finding is inconsistent 
with the literature on depressive symptomology and mindfulness interventions, and the current 
literature does not provide a framework to explain this abnormality.  This phenomenon deserves 
further consideration if the direction of this effect is replicated. 
None of the interactions tested in Experiment 3 were significant.  While recall condition 
and SFNS both predicted change in depressive symptomology, the interaction between recall 
condition and SFNS did not predict change in depressive symptomology.  SFNS had the same 
effect on changing depressive symptomology across recall conditions.  The nostalgic and 
ordinary recall conditions had the same effect on changing depressive symptomology, regardless 
of SFNS, with the nostalgic recall predicted greater improvements in depressive symptomology 
than ordinary recall.  The main effects with a lack of interaction between SFNS and recall 
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condition may provide further evidence for the argument that nostalgic and ordinary recall may 
vary in intensity rather than in the type of effect they produce. 
Analyses of Experiment 3 found no evidence for an interaction between baseline 
depressive and recall type in predicting change in depression scores (hypothesis 3b2).  The 
difference in nostalgic and ordinary recall conditions in predicting changes in depressive 
symptomology remained the same across all levels of baseline depressive symptomology.  
Similarly, there was no interaction between baseline depressive and SFNS in predicting change 
in depression scores (hypothesis 3b3).  These results suggest that baseline level of depressive 
symptomology did not impact the relationships between change in depression score and either 
measure of nostalgia (recall condition and SFNS).  In both cases, nostalgia, whether 
experimentally manipulated (recall condition) or subjectively reported (SFNS) produced greater 
decreases in depressive symptomology, regardless of baseline depressive symptomology, than 
did measures associated with lower levels of nostalgia (i.e., ordinary recall condition and lower 
SFNS scores). 
Two three-way interactions were predicted for Experiment 3 and neither were significant.  
Hypothesis 3b4 posited that the mindfulness intervention should mitigate the differential effects 
of depression on recall condition, and hypothesis 3b5 posited that the mindfulness intervention 
should mitigate the differential effects of depression on SFNS.  The mindfulness intervention did 
not change the relationship between depressive symptomology and recall condition or the one 
between depressive symptomology and SFNS.   
Method of Delivery 
 Experiments 1 and 2 were conducted online while experiment 3 was conducted in person 
in a classroom setting. All experiments used independent samples and implemented the same 
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protocol for the memory recall. This use of the same measures and methods allowed for a 
comparison of results between online and in-person delivery methods. Factor loadings for the 
latent variables of depressive symptomology and nostalgic benefit were similar. Furthermore, in 
all experiments, higher levels of depressive symptomology predicted lower state levels of 
nostalgia. The replication of these findings across experiments suggests a congruence of findings 
and suggests that the presence of an experimenter does not affect the effect of induced nostalgia.  
Similarities across methods of delivery could have implications for telemedicine and for 
web- or mobile-based interventions. Although research on the efficacy of such intervention 
methods is still in its naissance and has yielded mixed findings (Maher et al., 2014; Wantland, 
Portillo, Holzemer, Slaughter, & McGhee, 2004), preliminary research has shown the use of 
technology in the provision of healthcare at a distance is an effective method of delivering 
treatment for a range of problematic behaviors. For instance, issues such as weight loss and 
physical activity (Harvey-Berino et al., 2010; Neve, Morgan, Jones, & Collins, 2010; Stephens & 
Allen, 2013), glucose monitoring in diabetes (Cho, Lee, Lim, Kwon, & Yoon, 2009),  and 
alcohol consumption (Gustafson et al., 2014) have been treated effectively utilizing technology 
aided, distance-based interventions. Research has also pointed to the delivery of various 
psychotherapy interventions via telemedicine as equally efficacious to their in-person 
counterparts (Gros, Yoder, Tuerk, Lozano, & Acierno, 2011; Mitchell et al., 2008). Telemedicine 
as well as other web- and mobile-based interventions reduce cost and improve access to care 
(Hilty et al., 2013; Spaulding, Belz, DeLurgio, & Williams, 2010). Given these benefits, research 
testing the application of interventions through these modalities with clinical or clinically similar 
populations, such as the present study, have potential benefits. Furthermore, since research on 
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these delivery methods is still in its early stages, further work is needed to determine factors that 
enhance and hinder efficacy. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Several limitations of the present study warrant discussion. One such limitation was that 
this study examined experimentally prompted nostalgic rather than naturally evoked nostalgic 
feelings. Measuring the effects of naturally occurring feelings of nostalgia is difficult from a 
methodological standpoint as a variety of stimuli can evoke these feelings and the stimuli can 
vary between individuals. Given that this study did not evaluate naturally occurring nostalgia, it 
cannot be assumed that naturally occurring nostalgia would produce the same pattern of results. 
However, exploring induced nostalgia is of clinical value. If results from this study 
demonstrating that nostalgic benefit can reduce state depressive symptomology can be replicated 
in a broader sample and in clinically depressed samples, then nostalgic recall may be a helpful, 
adjunctive therapeutic tool.  
 This study employed a brief, single session mindfulness intervention. Such brief 
interventions can induce changes in state levels of mindfulness but are unlikely to cause 
substantial changes to underlying cognitive patterns that are seen in experienced meditators 
(Davidson, 2010). Furthermore, Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, and Toney (2006) 
demonstrated that the components comprising the construct of mindfulness change with 
experience level of the meditator. This study can only comment on how state level changes in 
mindfulness affect the relationship between depressive symptomology and state levels of 
nostalgia, which may or not be the same way that higher trait level changes in mindfulness affect 
these relationships. Given that individuals can become more proficient at mindfulness with 
practice (Morgan, Graham, Hayes-Skelton, Orsillo, & Roemer, 2014) and longer interventions 
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have demonstrated greater effects (Wu et al., 2013), the brevity the current study’s mindfulness 
intervention may limit the potential effects of mindfulness on state depressive symptomology 
and state levels of nostalgia. Future longitudinal studies could address the efficacy of longer 
mindfulness interventions as well as the duration of the effects of both the mindfulness 
intervention and the nostalgic recall.  
 Another limitation may be varying degrees of motivation to engage in the memory recall 
or mindfulness exercise. Motivation, adherence, and quality of practice are suggested to play a 
role in the effectiveness of mindfulness based interventions (de Vibe et al., 2012; Del Re, 
Flückiger, Goldberg, & Hoyt, 2013). Degree of motivation to engage in the exercise may vary 
between undergraduates participating in a study for course credit and individuals seeking 
treatment in a clinical setting to improve quality of life and address depressive symptoms. 
 One potential way to assess engagement in the memory recall is to examine the 
qualitative content of participants’ memory accounts. Degree of detail, word count, and memory 
specificity may be indicators of engagement. Additional variables such as amount of emotional 
language, emotional valence, past focus, and number of verbs may also be valuable predictors of 
nostalgic benefit and resultant mood change. Assessing emotional valence may be especially 
valuable as nostalgic memories often contain both positive and negative affect (Hepper et al., 
2014). Evaluating the centrality of positive and negative affect may be an important 
consideration with respect to depressive symptomology’s effects on state level of nostalgia and 
to changes in depressive symptomology. Furthermore, there is debate as to the core emotional 
focus in nostalgic recall with some scholars arguing that it is positive, others contending that is 
negative, and others suggesting that it is mixed (Hepper et al., 2012). Manipulating the nostalgic 
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memory prompt to focus on each of these orientations may be useful for assessing whether the 
emotional focus of the memory effects the effects of nostalgia.  
 Obtaining a more diverse age range of participants would help expand the current study. 
One study comparing the extent to which younger and older adults use of autobiographical 
memory to help promote a cohesive sense of self found that younger adults tend to use 
autobiographical recall more frequently for this purpose than older adults who have accumulated 
more life experiences to rehearse and reaffirm their identity over the years (Bluck & Alea, 2008). 
This suggests that the effects of nostalgic recall may vary with age and may not bear the same 
relationship with depressive symptomology across the lifespan. 
This study was an initial step at elucidating how varying degrees of negative mood 
symptomology affect state levels of nostalgia. The current study investigated hypotheses about 
the effects of engaging in nostalgic recall and state levels of nostalgia on reducing depressive 
symptomology in a general population. Future work investigating these relationships in samples 
of clinical depressed individuals is need to determine if nostalgic recall could be a useful 
adjunctive therapeutic tool. Nostalgic interventions could be implemented much like Cognitive 
Process Therapy (CPT) for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), emphasizing the importance 
of self-referential memories and narrative frameworks as intervention tools.  
From an approach/avoidance framework, individuals with PTSD have an increased 
avoidance to thoughts and reminders of traumatic events much as individuals with depression 
have a decreased approach to and devaluing of positive events (Trew, 2011). In CPT, therapists 
work with clients to build skills then use these skills to address avoidance and process traumatic 
memories. Like in CPT, interventions that may be effective for depression and incorporate 
nostalgic recall could entail the therapist working with clients to build skills and process positive 
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aspects memories they overlook. In this case, such skills may include greater awareness into the 
occurrence of ruminative thoughts and how to be more reflective and mindful when they do 
occur, as well as increasing insights into how depression has changed individuals’ beliefs and 
how to challenge maladaptive beliefs by learning to accommodate positive information and 
reduce assimilation of negative information. Then, therapists could work with clients to approach 
positive memories and help clients to bridge their past and present selves as well as to process 
the meaning that clients ascribe to these memories. This type of treatment would aid individuals 
in becoming more aware of their maladaptive thoughts, in becoming more aware of how these 
thoughts influence their interpretation of positive events (e.g., nostalgic memories), and in 
learning ways to reframe these thoughts. These skills may then allow depressed individuals to 
recognize and attain boosts in well-being from incidental exposure to positive events such as 
nostalgic reminders that they often miss. These changes, with the aid of nostalgic recall, should 
in turn decrease depressive symptomology. 
Conclusion 
 The present study explored the effects of nostalgia on depressive symptomology. To date, 
nostalgia and its effects have been examined in numerous contexts. Past research has 
demonstrated engaging in nostalgic recall is associated with higher scores on measures related to 
well-being. However, research had yet to investigate the effects of nostalgic recall with respect to 
depressive symptomology and mindfulness as a potential way to enhance nostalgic recall’s 
effects. Exploring nostalgic recall in the context of depressive symptomology is important 
because the cognitive processing biases inherent in depressive symptoms can influence the way 
depressed individuals recall and interrupt memories. The present study expanded previous work 
on nostalgic recall in several ways. This study demonstrated that higher levels of depressive 
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symptomology reduced state levels of nostalgia when recalling both ordinary and nostalgic 
memories. It also found that higher self-reported levels of mindfulness, a skill often used to 
address this aberrant pattern of information processing in depression, can increase state levels of 
nostalgia. Although the mindfulness intervention did not predict changes in depressive 
symptomology in the expected direction, it is possible that people’s engagement partially 
mediates the relationship between mindfulness and state levels of nostalgia. Finally, both 
engaging in a nostalgic recall (compared to ordinary recall) and experiencing higher state levels 
of nostalgia predicted decreases in state depressive symptomology. If these findings hold true in 
clinically depressed samples, evoking feelings of nostalgia may be a useful therapeutic tool for 
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Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(Watson et al., 1988) 
 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read 
each item and then mark the appropriate answer to indicate to what extent you are currently 
feeling that emotion. 
 
          Very Slightly or 
Not at All 
A little Moderately True Quite a bit Extremely 
1 2 3 4 5 
          
 _______ Interested _______ Hostile  _______ Nervous 
  _______ Distressed _______ Enthusiastic _______ Determined 
 _______ Excited   _______ Proud  _______ Attentive 
  _______ Upset  _______ Irritable  _______ Jittery 
  _______ Strong  _______ Alert  _______ Active 
  _______ Guilty  _______ Ashamed _______ Afraid 
































Rumination and Reflection Questionnaire 
(Trapnell & Campbell, 1999) 
 
For each of the statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.  
   
      
 Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
  




My attention is often focused on aspects of myself I wish I'd stop 
thinking about. 
 
_______ I always seem to be rehashing in my mind recent things I've said or done. 
 
_______ Sometimes it is hard for me to shut off thoughts about myself. 
 
_______ 
Long after an argument or disagreement is over with, my thoughts keep 
going back to what happened. 
 
_______ 
I tend to "ruminate" or dwell over things that happen to me for a really 
long time afterward. 
 
_______ I don't waste time rethinking things that are over and done with. 
 
_______ Often I'm playing back over in my mind how I acted in a past situation. 
 
_______ I often find myself reevaluating something I've done. 
 
_______ I never ruminate or dwell on myself for very long. 
 
_______ It is easy for me to put unwanted thoughts out of my mind. 
 
_______ 




I spent a great deal of time thinking back over my embarrassing or 
disappointing moments. 
 
_______ Philosophical or abstract thinking doesn't appeal to me that much. 
 
_______ I'm not really a meditative type of person. 
 
_______ I love exploring my "inner" self. 
 
_______ My attitudes and feelings about things fascinate me. 
 
_______ I don't really care for introspective or self-reflective thinking. 
 
_______ I love analyzing why I do things. 
 
_______ People often say I'm a "deep," introspective type of person. 
 
_______ I don't care much for self-analysis. 
 
_______ I'm very self-inquisitive by nature. 
 
_______ I love to meditate on the nature and meaning of things. 
 
_______ I often love to look at my life and philosophical ways. 
 









Multidimensional Depression Assessment Scale 
(H. N. Cheung & Power, 2012) 
 
Please indicate how often you have experienced the previous items in the past two weeks. 
   
      
 Not at all Rarely Sometimes Often All the time 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
  
      
 
 
_______ Low mood 
 





_______ Changes in appetite 
  
 
_______ Low spirits 
 





_______ Feel slowed down 
  
 
_______ Sad mood 
 
_______ Fatigue 










   
 
_______ Not cheerful 
 
_______ Agitation 
   
 
_______ Irritable mood 
 
_______ Slowed movement 
  
 
_______ Dysphoric mood 
 










_______ Decrease in activities 
 
 
_______ Feelings of hopelessness _______ Social withdrawal  
  
 
_______ Loss of interest 
 
_______ Feeling worse than others 
 
 
_______ No pleasure 
 
_______ Feel a burden on others 
 
 
_______ The future feels bleak _______ Social avoidance 
  
 
_______ Feelings worthless 
 
_______ Feeling undeserving of others care 
 
_______ Poor concentration 
 





_______ Feeling less attractive than others 
 
_______ Life feels meaningless _______ Feel too sensitive to others 
 
 
_______ Feeling a failure 
 





_______ Unable to love others  
 
 
_______ Unable to make decisions _______ Aggression towards others 
 
 
_______ Low energy 
















Please bring to mind a nostalgic event in your life. Nostalgia is often defined as a sentimental 
longing or affection for the past. Specifically, try to think of a past event that makes you feel 
most nostalgic.  Bring this nostalgic experience to mind.  Immerse yourself in the 
nostalgic experience.  How does it make you feel?  Please continue to think about the 
experience for a few moments. 
          In the space below, write about this nostalgic event.  Please describe the experience and how it 




Please bring to mind an ordinary event in your life. Specifically, try to think of a past event that 
is ordinary.  Bring this ordinary experience to mind.  Immerse yourself in the ordinary 
experience.  How does it make you feel?  Please continue to think about the experience for a few 
moments. 
          In the space below, write about this ordinary event.  Please describe the experience and how it 


























Nostalgic Manipulation Check 
(W.-Y. Cheung et al., 2013; Routledge et al., 2011; Sedikides et al., 2014; Wildschut et al., 2006) 
 
For each of the statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.  
          
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree nor 
Disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
              1     2         3                         4  5 
_______ Right now, I am feeling quite nostalgic. 
_______ Right now, I am having nostalgic feelings. 




































Toronto Mindfulness Scale  
(Lau et al., 2006) 
 
We are interested in what you just experienced.  Below is a list of things that people sometimes 
experience.  Please read each statement.  Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each 
statement.  In other words, how well does the statement describe what you just experienced 
while recalling your event? 
          
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
          
 
_______ I experienced myself as separate from my changing thoughts and feelings. 
 
_______ 




I was curious about what I might learn about myself by taking notice of how 
I react to certain thoughts, feelings or sensations. 
 
_______ 
I experienced my thoughts more as events in my mind that as necessarily 
accurate reflection of the way things 'really' are. 
 
_______ I was curious to see what my mind was up to from moment to moment. 
 
_______ I was curious about each of the thoughts and feelings that I was having. 
 
_______ 
I was receptive to observing unpleasant thoughts and feelings without 
interfering with them. 
 
_______ 
I was more invested in just watching my experiences as they arose, than in 
figuring out what they could mean. 
 
_______ 
I approached each experience by trying to accept it, no matter whether it was 
pleasant or unpleasant. 
 
_______ I remained curious about the nature of each experience as it arose. 
 
_______ I was aware of my thoughts and feelings without over identifying with them. 
 
_______ I was curious about my reaction to things. 
 
_______ 
I was curious about what I might learn about myself by just taking notice of 
















State Functions of Nostalgia Scale 
(Hepper et al., 2012) 
 
For each of the statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.  




     
Strongly 
Agree 




Thinking about this event... 
 
 
_______ makes me feel happy 
     
 
_______ puts me in a good mood 
     
 
_______ makes me feel active 
     
 
_______ makes me feel calm 
      
 
_______ makes me value myself more 
     
 
_______ makes me feel like I have many positive qualities 
   
 
_______ makes me feel good about myself 
    
 
_______ makes me like myself better 
     
 
_______ makes me feel loved 
     
 
_______ makes me feel connected to loved ones 
    
 
_______ makes me feel protected 
     
 
_______ makes me feel I can trust others 
    
 
_______ makes me feel that life is worth living 
    
 
_______ makes me feel life is meaningful 
    
 
_______ makes me feel life has a purpose 
    
 
_______ makes me feel there is a greater purpose to life 



















New General Self-Efficacy Scale 
(Chen et al., 2001) 
 
For each of the statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.  
          
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neither Agree 
nor Disagree 
Agree Strongly Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
          
 
_______ I will be able to achieve most of the goals that I have set for myself. 
 
 
_______ When facing difficult tasks, I am certain that I will accomplish them. 
 
 
_______ In general, I think that I can obtain outcomes that are important to me. 
 
 
_______ I believe I can succeed at most any endeavor to which I set my mind. 
 
 
_______ I will be able to successfully overcome many challenges.  
  
 
_______ I am confident that I can perform effectively on many different tasks. 
 
 
_______ Compared to other people, I can do most tasks very well. 
  
 
_______ Even when things are tough, I can perform well. 






























Self-Concept Clarity Scale 
(Campbell et al., 1996) 
 
For each of the statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.  
          




1 2 3 4 5 
          
 
_______ My beliefs about myself often conflict with one another. 
 
_______ 
On one day I might have one opinion of myself and on another day I 
might have a different opinion. 
 
_______ 
I spend a lot of time wondering about what kind of person I really 
am. 
 
_______ Sometimes I feel that I am not really the person that I appear to be. 
 
_______ 
When I think about the kind of person I have been in the past, I'm not 
sure what I was really like. 
 
_______ 
I seldom experience conflict between the different aspects of my 
personality. 
 
_______ Sometimes I think I know other people better than I know myself.  
 
_______ My beliefs about myself seem to change very frequently. 
 
_______ 
If I were asked to describe my personality, my description might end 
up being different from one day to another day. 
 
_______ 
Even if I wanted to, I don't think I could tell someone what I'm really 
like. 
 
_______ In general, I have a clear sense of who I am and what I am. 
 
_______ 
It is often hard for me to make up my mind about things because I 




















Social Connectedness Scale 
(Lee & Robbins, 1995) 
 
For each of the statements, please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement.  
 
Strongly Disagree     Disagree     Somewhat Disagree    Somewhat Agree     Agree     Strongly Agree            
                 1                     2                           3                               4                      5                    6                     
          
 
_______ I feel disconnected from the world around me. 
   
 
_______ Even around people I know, I don’t feel that I really belong. 
  
 
_______ I feel so distant from people. 
     
 
_______ I have no sense of togetherness with my peers.  
   
 
_______ I don't feel related to anyone. 
     
 
_______ I catch myself losing all sense of connectedness with society.  
  
 
_______ Even among friends, there is no sense of brother/sisterhood. 
  
 
_______ I don't feel I participate with anyone or any group. 
   
 
_______ I feel more comfortable when someone is constantly with me. 
 
 
_______ I'm more at ease doing things together with other people. 
  
 
_______ Working side by side with others is more comfortable than working alone. 
 
_______ My life is incomplete without a buddy beside me. 
   
 
_______ It's hard for me to use my skills and talents without someone beside me. 
 
 
_______ I stick to my friends like glue. 
     
 
_______ I join groups more for the friendship than the activity itself. 
  
 
_______ I wish to find someone who can be with me all the time. 
   
 
 
 
 
